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ABSTRACT
The study evaluated farmworker equity-sharing schemes administered by the
Worcester regional office of the Department of Land Affairs in the Western Cape.
The objectives were to investigate the performance of farmworker equity-sharing
schemes against recent literature, to evaluate the motivation for the establishment of
these schemes and whether they served the purpose for which they were established.
Through investigating the role these schemes play in improving the farmworkers '
livelihood, the study investigated the changes farmworkers experienced on the farm
since the establishment of the schemes. The perceptions of farmworkers regarding the
schemes were also investigated.
The study found that at all the farms evaluated there was a lack of formal training to
all the levels of farmworkers, including committee members and shareholder workers.
These farms did not have the funds to finance training programmes for their
farmworkers. Poor training impeded farmworkers to utilise their skills and participate
in decision making on the farm. Contrary to the objectives of financial participation
and farmworker equity-sharing schemes, most of these schemes did not achieve the
broad objectives of the participation schemes such as empowering their workers.
Living and working conditions seem to have improved on most of the farms although
some farms seem to have experienced no change at all. The ESTA Laws could be the
cause of the improvements in housing and working conditions but not the
implementation of the farmworker equity-sharing schemes. Respondents did not seem
to experience discrimination due to gender. Financially the schemes are not
performing well. This is evident from the number of schemes that were liquidated due
to financial problems and for which financial statements could not be obtained. These
schemes face various institutional and structural challenges, which includes financial
challenges.
Il
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie het plaaswerker-aandeelhouerskemas wat deur die Worcester-
streekskantoor van die Departement van Grondsake in die Wes-Kaap bestuur word,
geëvalueer. Die oogmerke van die studie was om die verrigting van plaaswerker-
aandeelhouerskemas teenoor onlangse literatuur te ondersoek, om die motivering vir
die vestiging van hierdie skemas te evalueer en te bepaal of hulle wel die doel dien
waarvoor hulle gevestig is. Deur die rol van hierdie skemas in die verbetering van
plaaswerkers se bestaan te ondersoek, het die studie ook ondersoek ingestel na die
veranderinge wat sedert die vestiging van die skemas deur plaaswerkers ervaar is. Die
plaaswerkers se persepsies van die skemas is ook ondersoek.
Die studie het bevind dat daar by al die plase wat betrek is 'n tekort aan formele
opleiding aan al die vlakke van plaaswerkers was, met inbegrip van komiteelede en
aandeelhouer-werkers. Hierdie plase het nie oor die fondse beskik om
opleidingsprogramme vir hulle plaaswerkers te finansier nie. Swak opleiding strem
plaaswerkers in die toepassing van hulle vaardighede en in hulle deelname aan
besluitneming op die plaas. In stryd met die doelwitte van finansiële deelname en
plaaswerker-aandeelhouerskemas het hierdie skemas nie in hulle doel geslaag nie.
Woon- en werksomstandighede op die meeste plase het blykbaar sedert die vestiging
van die skemas verbeter, alhoewel sommige plase skynbaar geen vemaderinge
ondergaan het nie. Die Wet op die Uitbreiding van Sekerheid op Verblyfreg kan 'n
verklaring vir die verbetering in behuising en werksomstandighede wees, en nie
noodwendig die implementering van die plaaswerker-aandeelhouerskemas nie.
Respondente het volgens alle aanduidings nie diskriminasie op grond van geslag
ondervind nie. Die skemas presteer finansieel nie goed nie. Dit is duidelik uit die getal
skemas wat as gevolg van finansiële probleme gelikwideer is en waarvoor finansiële
state nie verkry kon word nie. Hierdie skemas staar verskeie institusionele en
strukturele uitdagings in die gesig, waaronder ook finansiële uitdagings.
111
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The racial legacy had far-reaching consequences for the ownership of resources such
as land and water in South Africa. It had a significant impact on the social, economic
and political aspects of the country. Past government policies created a significant
difference between races and between sectors of the economy. This resulted in two
dimensions in agriculture, namely commercial and 'homeland' agriculture.
The 1913 Natives' Land Act, for example, emphasised government intentions to
separate the two sectors and both the 1913 and the 1936 Land Acts resulted III
homelands and settlement differences along racial boundaries (Vink, 1992). The
majority of the population, which consisted of blacks, was allocated fragmented
agricultural land - about 14 percent of the total land area. In contrast, about 86
percent was made available to the white minority (Harsch, 1992; Shepherd, 1994).
These differences were later intensified by government policies, which were
accompanied by racial laws driving traditional farmers to work on white-owned
farms.
Ramaphosa' once said, "The oldest continuing call of the ANC is ... Mayibuye
iAfrica! Come back Africa. The dispossession of the majority must come to an end.
Unless we settle the land question, we do not have a country. Ifwe handle it badly, we
tear South Africa to pieces. Ifwe manage it well, we create the foundations for a truly
united nation" (Shepherd, 1994). Hence, land reform has to playa significant role in
the process of redressing past inequalities.
Land is generally a primary means of subsistence and income generation for most
rural people all over the world. The present government resolved to redistribute 30
percent of the agricultural land through land policy and statutory laws between 1995
and 2015 to benefit the previously marginalised communities (AgriReview, 2003).
The land will be transferred to about 600 000 farming households resulting into two
million farm livelihoods (Williams et al, 1996). This was to be done using various
IMr Cyril Ramaphosa was once ANC general-secretary and chief political negotiator.
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land redistribution programmes. It is expected that this will give an opportunity to the
previously marginalised communities to own land.
Van Zyl (1994), doubts that equality of opportunity will solve the issue of favouritism
in South Africa. Eckert (in Van Zyl, 1994) remarks "consensus seems to favour
equality of opportunity as a driving ethic in the economic sphere". Furthermore,
Backeberg (1996) argues that increased productivity and allocation of resources for
the development of efficiency and equity are a form of balanced economic growth and
development.
The introduction of land reform policy is one of the positive factors meant to bring
about improved livelihoods and curb racial imbalances. Land reform consists of three
phases, namely land restitution, securing land tenure systems and land redistribution.
Equity-sharing schemes are but one of the forms of market-based land reform
programmes falling under land redistribution. However, equity-sharing schemes do
not only serve to redistribute land but entail other benefits as well.
1.2 Worker participation and farmworker equity-sharing schemes
Equity-sharing schemes and profit-sharing schemes are but other forms of worker
participation. These are meant to serve various purposes. The existing forms of
worker participation have a close resemblance but differ in their structure, function
and the level of worker participation. In the United States, worker participation
schemes comprise workers' democracy, profit sharing and worker ownership
programmes. Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b) write that worker participation
schemes have been used in various countries over the past years with little research to
ascertain the factors predicting their adoption and maintenance.'
Positive experience from other countries has encouraged the South African
government to assist the implementation of farmworker equity-sharing schemes.
These are meant to empower workers and improve productivity without distorting the
operational efficiency on farms. Farmworker equity-sharing schemes in South Africa
could also be used as a unique strategy for land redistribution and agrarian reform
(Ngqangweni & Van Rooyen, 1995b).
2 Due to the problem with transaction costs, such as opportunism and bounded rationality, to which all
such investments are prone (Karaan, 2003).
2
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The idea in South Africa was initiated by the private sector in the early 1990s (Knight
& Lyne, 2002). In farmworker equity-sharing schemes, farmworkers buy shares in a
farm, either in an enterprise or in the whole farm they work in. These schemes
promote partnerships between farm owners and farmworkers for the benefit of both.
Hence, successful schemes should show certain positive benefits for all parties
involved.
Knight and Lyne (2002) emphasise that farmworker equity-sharing schemes should
distribute wealth and future benefits, empower workers, retain or attract quality
management and attract capital from the private sector to finance investment. These
benefits also include improving worker productivity, better labour relations and, in the
long run, transfer of both ownership and management of commercial farms to
previously disadvantaged workers.
These schemes are agreements freely entered into by the parties involved, whereby
workers (employees) become beneficiaries of the farm they work for by owning
shares in the farm or in an enterprise on the farm (Nel et al, 1995; Hall et al, 2001).
Thus, these schemes allow farmworkers to acquire shares in the farm while they are
still employees receiving salaries. In most cases, these schemes are privately owned
farming operations that are generally restructured as companies with the original
owner of the farm and the farmworkers as shareholders (Knight & Lyne, 2002).
1.3 Problem statement
Equity-sharing schemes are a form of an organisational structure, which can serve
different purposes and could also be implemented under different circumstances by
various role players. They can be used to empower farmworkers through active
participation in the operation of the farm as beneficiaries. These schemes are
supposed to benefit all parties in the partnership, namely the owner/farmer, the farm
manager and the workers. All the role players share in the risk of the operation of a
farming enterprise or the entire farm. The coalition management formed by these
parties can differ in management level from farm to farm. These schemes also serve
as incentives as workers possess assets on the farm. But the following aspects need to
be investigated in order to assess the level of their success:
3
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• The rationale behind the establishment of these schemes and whether they
really achieve their intended purpose.
• The role these schemes play in influencing the shareholders' /workers'
livelihoods.
• The attitude of the shareholders/workers towards the schemes.
• The institutions that are in place to assist farmworkers in improving their
understanding of the scheme and the transfer of skills.
Thus, this study investigated the farmworkers ' perceptions, awareness of the benefits
of such schemes and their level of participation. The success of these equity-sharing
schemes was investigated by considering different institutional, technical and
environmental support structures made available to the workers to assist them in
improving their livelihoods.
There is a possibility that some of these schemes are suggested during financial crisis
and thus work only as easy cash pumps, replacing commercial loans to finance the
farm operations. Therefore the reasons behind each farmworker equity-sharing
scheme programme need to be investigated. According to Knight and Lyne (2002),
previous studies have indicated negative and positive arguments for farmworker
equity-sharing schemes in South Africa.
1.4 Motivation
Government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have embarked on a quest
to push poverty fronts while at the same time dealing with pertinent issues such as
equity and the distribution of wealth, especially to the poor. Farmworker equity-
sharing schemes might seem to be good practices that are initiated with earnest
intentions to redress past indifferences and improve productivity. Such schemes,
however, can result from opportunistic behaviour. It could prove the schemes not to
be worthwhile, as they do not deliver on their intended purposes. Hence the study will
investigate the authenticity of the reasons behind these schemes and detail the views
of the role players.
The study will provide a holistic overview of the perceptions of all the role players in
the schemes by integrating the farmers/farm owners, farm managers and the
4
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farmworkers in the study to determine benefits accrued for each. Previous studies on
equity-sharing schemes indicate contrasting views about the performance of these
schemes. The study done by Eckert et al (1995) showed positive contribution of the
investigated scheme towards improving the human capital of the farmworkers and
suggested a good economic performance.
The Surplus People Project (SPP) (1999) conducted studies in the Western Cape and
in Mpumalanga and found that most of the schemes did not perform as expected.
Knight and Lyne (2002) wrote that most of the criticism about these schemes could be
attributed to the SPP's study of farmworker equity-sharing schemes in South Africa.
Results of the study conducted by Knight and Lyne (2002) on the Whitehall Farms in
1996 contrasted with results of the study conducted by the SPP on the same farm.
Some of the differences in the findings could be as a result of a single perspective,
such as investigating the farmworkers ' perspective with little emphasis on the
managers' or other role players' perspective about the scheme.
This study will benefit government and NGOs involved in equity-sharing schemes
and various other institutions offering financial and other support. Previous studies
have concentrated their research on the performances of these schemes and less
attention has been given to their role in redressing the poor standards of living of the
farmworkers, among other issues. These schemes could perform well financially
although the benefits do not trickle down to the beneficiaries. The study will also
benefit policy makers by highlighting various policies that need to be enforced in
order to assist farmworkers to best utilise the benefits presented by equity-sharing
schemes.
1.5 Research objectives
The aim of this study was first to explore the reasons behind the establishment of
equity-sharing schemes in general. Against the background of the recent literature on
equity-sharing schemes, the study evaluated existing equity-sharing schemes
administered by the Worcester regional office of the Department of Land Affairs
(DLA) in the Western Cape. The objective was to ascertain what the motivations were
for the various parties involved in initiating the equity-sharing scheme on their farm
and whether the schemes served the purpose for which they were established.
5
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The study further investigated the role these schemes play in improving the
farmworkers' livelihoods and their impact on improving these farms' human capital.
Therefore the study investigated the socio-economic conditions of the farmworkers.
The financial performance of these schemes to date was analysed in order to evaluate
their financial performance relative to that of the industry.
1.6 Hypotheses
The main hypothesis of the study is that equity-sharing schemes can benefit all the
role players on the farm and the farm as a whole. These benefits are reflected in the
improvements that occur in the process of implementation and after the
implementation of the scheme. Such changes aim at improving the efficiency of the
farm and to make it competitive and sustainable.
The specific hypotheses formulated for this study were as follows:
• Social aspects of the farmworkers are expected to improve since the inception
of the scheme.
• In order for workers to better utilise the benefits presented by the schemes,
necessary institutional arrangements, such as training aimed at assisting them
with the overall operation of the equity-sharing scheme, would need to be
implemented.
• Investment in technical and environmentally friendly means need to be made
in these schemes as these would work towards improving working conditions
of farmworkers and hence the performance of the equity-sharing scheme.
• These schemes would show improvements in their financial performance.
1.7 Research method and design
The study was conducted on the farms administered by the Worcester regional
officers of the DLA in the Western Cape. The study evaluated equity-sharing schemes
which were regarded as fully operational considering the number of years in
operation. Most of the schemes were more than two years in operation. The reason for
choosing schemes that were regarded as fully operational is that their financial
performance would be clearer due to returns on investments. In addition, benefits
6
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from investments would accrue over a period of time and enable a clear indication of
the performance of the scheme. For this study both primary and secondary data was
used. Each scheme was evaluated using the case study method.
The initial business plans required by the DLA were used to acquire necessary
descriptive information pertaining to the general operations of the various schemes.
These were obtained by working in collaboration with the regional office of the DLA
and with the managers of the various schemes. Financial statements were analysed to
evaluate the financial performance of the schemes. To investigate social aspects of the
perceptions of the role players and their attitudes towards the schemes, the study made
use of structured questionnaire surveys. These questionnaires were administered
through personal interviews. Respondents sampled from each group of role players in
the equity-sharing schemes were interviewed.
1.8 Sequence of chapters
In Chapter 2, a literature review of worker participation practice IS discussed,
focussing on a theoretical description of the concept and the forms of worker
participation. A description of farmworker equity-sharing schemes is discussed in
Chapter 3. In this chapter the aspects of these schemes and their operations are
elaborated on, the concept is described, and issues and experiences from case studies
done in South Africa are discussed. In Chapter 4, the research methodology is
outlined and financial performance measures are dealt with. An overview of the study
area and the overview of the farms included in the study are also discussed. Chapter 5
consists of the evaluation of the farms. A statistical comparison of the farms is
provided in Chapter 6 along with the evaluation of the financial statements of those
farms from which financial statements could be obtained. In Chapter 7, conclusions
are drawn and recommendations are made.
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CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF WORKER PARTICIPATION
2.1 Introduction
Worker participation practices have existed in vanous forms in the political
economies of most industrialised nations. These practices been accepted in both
developed and developing countries, which has resulted in most countries adopting
worker participation in their national constitutions. Córdova (1982) writes that the
broader sense of the term 'worker participation' has been regarded as a desirable
development in most democratic societies.
This practice has been associated with workers' democracy in their workplace. In
countries such as Germany, this practice is also known as industrial democracy
(Robinson, 1990). According to Schregle (1987), the characteristics of worker
participation are highly institutionalised practices based on detailed legislation,
applied, interpreted and supplemented by a host of court decisions.
Worker participation practices have been suggested under different economic
conditions in various companies.' Previously, in most countries worker participation
has been implemented in periods of growth and expansion with the main focus on
solving diversified work related problems and motivation. There is a notion that
worker participation resulted from periods of recession, industrial unrest, shortage of
skilled labour and declining productivity. This resulted into different names given to
the practice of active workers' involvement and participation in decision-making.
This practice is also known as worker participation, industrial democracy, worker's
control, self-management, workplace democracy, worker's employee involvement and
quality of work life (QWL) (Sirianni, 1987).
The decision to implement the practice is sometimes in pursuit of addressing job
security and in some instances the survival of a company during times of recession,
unemployment and inflation. In non-union organisations, worker participation has
been seen as just another bureaucratic mechanism enabling management to possess
greater control over production (Harrison, 1997).
3 The terms 'company' and 'organisation' will be used interchangeably throughout this study.
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Monat and Sarfati (1986) argue that worker participation has in some cases been used
as a discriminatory tool when favour is given to certain categories of workers. In such
cases, only those certain categories of workers are allowed to express their views.
Hence, most countries have embarked on developing legislation for the introduction
of worker participation related practices. This legislation acts as a safeguard measure
against the manipulation and discrimination of workers.
Inmost companies management saw worker participation as a challenge, which was
going to introduce competition for the running of the company. These employers had
a problem with workers' representation in boards and other forms of participation in
the management of the company (Córdova, 1982).
This dislike gradually changed, as employers had a positive stance to worker
participation in the organisation of their working conditions and the determination of
their conditions of employment.' What interested most companies about worker
participation were the solutions it could bring regarding the problems and
consequences of any form of worker participation in the company's decision making.
Harrison (1997) is of the opinion that worker participation was supposed to encourage
workers to work harder and also increase their employer attachment. Earlier political
theorists argued the value of participation as a means of optimising individual
freedom and self-determination within a collective context (Poole, 1975).
In the late 1970s there was an increased move towards the establishment of works
councils' and growth in collective bargaining (Córdova, 1982). There have been
widespread changes in socio-economic conditions, which have brought about many
changes in the over-all growth of workers' participation adaptation, scope, structure
and function, which resulted in the diversification of systems (Emery & Thorsrud,
1969; Sirianni, 1987). The rapid development of different systems has resulted in the
4 Grant (1998a) writes that the unitarist approach holds that there is really no need for a conflict
between employers and their employees as it sees an organisation as a single unit. (According to
Hyman and Mason (1995), this approach favours small companies.) If a conflict exists it is due to a
.managerial system, which is too autocratic or the existence of poor communication between parties.
Thus the need for union intervention would be to address management failures. The pluralist approach,
on the other hand, holds the view that organisations are seen as having a combination of interest groups
and conflict between these groups is natural. Hence, unions are viewed as natural and necessary.
Lastly, the radical approach sees employers and employees rather representing opposite interest
groups. This approach is based on the Marxist ideology, which argues that worker control and other
organs of the system tend to supersede management. Thus, systems such as collective bargaining are
seen to benefit management rather than labour.
5 Works councils are another form of worker participation. This concept is discussed in Section 2.3.2.
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existence of different and diversified institutions responsible for workers'
participation. This created problems ranging from, confusion regarding
responsibilities, problems of demarcation between different forms and systems and an
impaired efficacy of decision-making (Córdova, 1982).
2.2 The concept of worker participation
The concept has been widely used in different countries around the world with little
uniformity in meaning. Participation may be casually interpreted as taking part in
something or being involved in something. Carby-Hall (1977) suggests that this
concept in its broad meaning is based on the community of interests between
employer and employees. This is opposed to working in separation of interests, which
is generally associated with collective bargaining. Córdova (1982) provides a world
definition of worker participation that is "involvement or participation outside
collective bargaining in decisions and processes relating to the employees' working
life" .
Although it is argued that the concept has no general definition, Salamon (in Anstey,
1990) suggests that worker participation lends itself to different interpretations:
• It could be interpreted as a socio-political concept or philosophy of industrial
organisation. This interpretation refers to a form of employee self-
management prevailing in organisations. These organisations may be
employee owned or state owned, with a strong managerial function performed
by elected representatives responsible for organisational decision making,
which includes allocation of profits or surplus value.
• It could also be interpreted as a generic term to encompass all processes and
institutions of employee influence. This employee influence ranges from
simple managerial information giving through joint consultation to collective
bargaining, works councils and forms of worker control within the
organisation.
• Lastly, it could be interpreted as denoting a phase in the evolutionary
development of traditional joint regulation process envisaging a move beyond
traditional collective bargaining, and certainly mere information-giving
10
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consultation ('pseudo-participation') to new levels of shared responsibility and
shared decision-making ('real participation').
In short, worker participation is viewed as a practice in which employees take part in
management decisions (Carby-Hall, 1977). Pateman (in Grant 1998b) describes
worker participation as involving a modification of the orthodox authority (to a lesser
or greater extent) structure where decision-making is a privilege of management, in
which workers play no part. There are five major areas of organisational effectiveness
that worker participation affects; these are motivation, satisfaction, acceptance of
change, problem solving and communication (Lombard, 1999).
The definition by Pateman (in Viljoen, 1986) leads to the understanding that effective
worker participation then requires that workers or employees receive the opportunity
to participate, and also should be encouraged to fully participate in decision making
by producing information, ideas and criticisms. They should be given constructive
feedback on their input and should be rewarded for their contribution in a meaningful
way.
Anstey (1990) noted various reasons behind the establishment of this practice, namely
to save jobs, reform capitalism," share wealth created, increase motivation and create
a sense of common identity with the company. Other reasons include raise capital via
tax concessions, acquire other companies and settle labour disputes. According to
Viljoen (1986), this practice allows workers to add to the planning, controlling and
organising functions of their jobs, motivating them and enhancing their individual and
company performance. According to Pateman (in Grant 1998b), the main aims of
worker participation are improved workplace democracy, improved labour relations
and workplace relations, increase in production and efficiency in the workplace and
sharing of company profits with workers.
Vaughan (in Viljoen, 1986) describes the practice of worker participation according to
three arguments: the motivational argument, the improved decision argument and the
industrial democracy model. According to the motivational argument, workers in the
participative system feel motivated and satisfied with the work they do, thus
6 Marx criticised the classical economists as unable to acknowledge the historical character of
capitalism. He argues that capital is a social relationship; it is not simply a set of means of production
but rather the power that their control gives to the bourgeoisie, the power to use the means of
production to produce profits. Only in a capitalist mode of production do the means of production
become capital (Screpanti & Zamagni, 2001).
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contributing to increased work productivity through their extra efforts. This
enthusiasm is stimulated by the feeling of their meaningful contribution to 'their'
company, which could be normally less or does not exist in companies that do not
practise worker participation.
According to the improved decision argument, worker participation induces easier
consensus among the role players in decision making in the company. This common
understanding allows for a smooth implementation of decisions as rationality in the
decision-making process would have been achieved through active participation of all
role players in the company. A study conducted by Harrison (1997) found that most
companies were actually hurt by worker participation. By using total production time
per unit of output to measure efficiency, he found that worker participation did not
result in efficiency at all. The main reason for the failure of worker participation in
these companies appeared to be the timing of the adoption of the practice, since the
practice was adopted to mend troubled relationships. Workers also seemed to distrust
such management-initiated programmes.
The industrial democracy model points out that worker participation allows for the
recognition of workers' rights as workers could make decisions pertaining to their
lives. These arguments are by no means independent and their success and validity
depends on the environment under which worker participative systems are
undertaken. For example, the prevailing corporate ethos would have a significant
impact on these arguments both individually and collectively.
According to Anstey (1997), worker participation can provide the following
opportunities: improved productivity and quality leading to greater competitiveness,
better organisational communication and coordination, more effective organisational
design, greater legitimising of decision making through consultation and sharing of
powers, individual employee development and improved conflict handling. He also
provides the requirements for the success of the practice: a unified vision from all role
players (management and workers), including more adversarial than confrontational
models of exchange, new information flows, new skills, extensive and on-going
training, realigned reward systems, holistic organisational thinking and reshaping,
performance objectives for everyone, appropriate fit of participative form to the goals
and capacities of those involved.
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Worker participation often still remains a debatable subject instead of being a reality.
This practice emerged as a new management strategy to offset various problems that
could be brought about by the economic and market forces (Monat & Sarfati, 1986).
There are different forms of worker participation, which differ with regard to the
scope of decision-making levels of the workers, the structure and the functions. A
distinction between direct (involving individuals or small groups) and indirect (joint
worker/management committees) as well as formal and non-formal worker
participation forms can be made. As Córdova (1982) remarks, this practice could take
different forms in different companies with functions including a simple provision of
information through suggestions, schemes, consultation, co-influence and co-
determination' all the way to self-management. Anstey (1997) describes direct
participation as task-oriented rather than power-oriented participation, while indirect
participation occurs through representation.
Pateman (in Grant, 1998b) clarifies this practice in terms of the existence of higher-
level participation (co-determination) and lower-level participation (participative
management). In higher-level participation, employees partake in decisions relating to
company policy, goals and production rates. This participation reflects worker
participation on decisions taken that not only concerns their work but the total
existence of the whole company. Subsequently, in lower-level participation,
participation is only related to decisions that affect the workers in their immediate
working environment. The highest level of participation is worker management.
Monat and Sarfati (1986) add that primary level worker participation could be seen as
a practice where management communicate information to the workers or their
representatives enabling them to ask for further clarification or details, mainly on
possible repercussions for the workforce. The higher level of participation would
involve joint ventures and consultation, here decision-making is done unanimously by
management and workers or representatives. In the higher level of participation,
workers have an equal say in the decisions pertaining to the operation and governance
of the company. Representatives representing workers on the company's board of
directors could sometimes fulfil this role of participation or involvement.
7 Co-determination is often referred to as corporatism.
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These levels or degrees of participation relate to a certain existing managerial style. A
particular managerial style could define an approach toward worker participation that
could likely be followed by a company and could also determine the extent to which
employees could make a positive contribution to the decision-making process. The
levels of employee participation in decision-making in a company under a particular
existing managerial system are illustrated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Employee decision-making and participation level within different
managerial systems
Managerial Participation level Decision-making process
system
Top-down Decisions come from the top
(management)
Autocratic Consultative Tentative decisions from the top
and ask for input
Consultati ve-upward Ideas are expected from the lower
communications level to the top
Consensus Everybody has to agree on
decisions taken in the organisation
Democratic Delegation with veto Lower level can decide, but
managers retain the right of veto
Delegation with policy Lower level make decisions within
guidelines the policy constraints
Pure delegation Total democracy to lower level to
make any decisions
Source: (;rant(1998b)
From Table 2.1 it can be seen that autocratic managerial systems tend to make
company decisions based on what management wants. These decisions normally
affect the workers at lower level (with little to no input from them). In totally
democratic managerial systems on the other hand, workers make unconstrained
decisions that have a real impact on the overall running of the company.
Anstey (1994) suggests several industrial relations changes that could be expected in
systems that are implementing worker participation practices, namely changes in the
level and nature of employment, the nature of the company, the organisation of the
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work, trade union strength and direction, the use of strike action and the shape of
collective bargaining systems.
2.3 Different forms of worker participation
Córdova (1982) discusses four forms of worker participation, namely shop-floor
participation, works councils, collective bargaining and representation on company
boards. These forms have three constituent elements that are necessary in
understanding the various forms of worker/employee participation (Córdova, 1982;
Salamon, in Anstey, 1990). These elements are:
(1) The method or extent 0f participation - direct or indirect. Direct forms reflect
the individual involvement in the decision-making processes while the indirect
forms reflect participation through elected representatives.
(2) The level in the organisation - work station level (lower level) to the board
level (higher level) of participation.
(3) The scope of participation - task-oriented participation versus power-oriented
participation. In task-oriented participation, the operational work situation is
the primary concern. This participation is normally associated with lower level
or direct forms of participation. On the other hand, power-oriented
participation tends to focus on managerial authority and decisions which
determine the framework or environment within which the operational
decisions have to be made.
This diversified nature of worker participation makes an exhaustive list of the forms
of worker participation impossible. The practice exists in different forms in differing
companies and countries, with the exalted benefits expected from the implementation
of worker participation as the main common factor. The forms of worker participation
range from ones that are implemented to encompass lower-level employees in an
existing company without changes in the organisational and managerial structures to
those that result in total alteration of the organisational and managerial structures.
However, there are some worker participation forms that are widespread. These are
discussed here.
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2.3.1 Collective bargaining
According to Anstey (1997), collective bargaining is one of the most widespread and
evident forms of worker participation worldwide. Schelling (in Morgan, 1998)
describes bargaining power as "one's ability to commit to a certain position and then
convince the opposition to come to the position s/he has committed to". Nel and Van
Rooyen (1985) write that collective bargaining is a process, which could be seen from
different spectrums depending on who's evaluating it. This practice has a different
connotation to an economist than to a psychologist.
Flanders (in Anstey, 1997) provides two reasons for driving collective bargaining in
different enterprises: firstly, the market control through, which management seek to
remove wages from competition and secondly, the managerial control through which
behaviour in the workplace is regulated by procedural arrangements. Globally
collective bargaining has shifted from concentrating on wages to encompass issues
such as job security, improved productivity and creating employment, and issues
directly affecting the worker, such as working hours, flexibility in working time
arrangements, and payment by performance systems (Anstey, 1994).
Anstey (1997) provides the following arguments for bargaining:
(1) It establishes minimum wages and labour standards.
(2) It promotes efficiency in bargaining.
(3) It promotes egalitarian working conditions across large and small companies.
(4) It promotes economies of scale in pension, medical and training schemes.
(5) It increases the power of labour and management, thereby limiting major
conflicts as both consider the scale of costs involved.
(6) It is a precondition to proactive, strategic unionism.
(7) It promotes sectoral policy formulation, regulation and administration.
(8) It provides resources for bargaining and human resource management
purposes not available to small companies.
(9) It 'neutralises' individual places of work from direct trade union activity.
These benefits have made this practice the most prominently used practice in different
countries under different conditions. Several theories such as the game theory and the
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organisational behaviour theory affect bargaining outcomes. Morgan (1998) writes
that bargaining in labour negotiations consists of the following integrated systems:
distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring and extra-
organisational bargaining.
The negotiation process could be affected by several factors of which some are
external to the organisation and others are internal, such as the organisation itself.
External factors include political factors, economic policy and public policy. Internal
factors are the organisational culture, the history of management-union relations in the
company, personalities of employer/employee representatives and the nature of
dispute (Morgan, 1998).
2.3.2 Works councils
The diversity of organisation in different working conditions has made it difficult for
management to implement various agreements even within one organisation. This has
led to the establishment of works councils or workplace forums, which are
responsible for disseminating agreements to the employees. This requires that
employees have representatives in management.
The crucial question is the nature and the degree of the participation of these workers
in management decisions and in the execution of those decisions. Prevailing
conditions within the more or less neutralised managerial spheres of labour-
management relations is crucial to determine the efficiency of the works councils,
while handicapped by several problems of representation, social integration and
solidarity with the interests of the labour force outside the undertaking (FUrstenberg,
1982).
Participative management IS set to "inform employees in advance before
implementing management decisions, but also giving employees majority control on
the organisation's governing body" (Israelstam & Marais, 1996). Carby-Hall (1977)
remarks works or employee councils usually possess greater powers - in particular the
power of veto on layoffs, work rules, rudiments, etc. - and represent employees
exclusively.
Works councils are made up of representatives from unions and non-union employee
groups with the sole responsibility, together with management, to control, implement
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and facilitate effective management of the organisation. In some instances workers are
elected to be labour/worker directors. This form of worker participation allows
workers to participate in the management board of the company. FUrstenberg (1982)
identifies features that characterise works councils e.g. a labour director could be a
full member of the managing board, sharing all the general responsibilities of his
colleagues and trusted by both the employees and the trade unions. According to
Furstenberg (1982), there are three requirements for an effective labour/worker
director, namely functional integration, social recognition and competence. A
labour/worker director could alternatively participate in the supervisory board.
2.3.3 Financial participation schemes"
Financial participation schemes could playa major role in motivating workers. This
motivation could largely be achieved through clear connection between payment and
performance. Mostert (1993) affirms that financial rewards received by workers could
act as a form of motivation for the workers, hence influencing the output. Thus,
according to Mostert (1993), financial participation is a form of a reward system
serving as a motivating factor for most people. Nel et al (1995) highlight that in
contrast to group-focused financial participation, share block schemes could be used
when the goal of a joint venture is to relate profit to individual performance or to
target sole ownership.
2.3.3.1 Farmworker equity-sharing schemes
Knight et al (2003) describe farmworker equity-sharing schemes as a form which
could be used to redistribute farm assets to land beneficiaries while maintaining the
validity of commercial farming operations. Lombard (1999) also states that most
importantly equity-sharing schemes provide incentives to the workers through the
encouragement of ownership (by encouraging self-independence), establishing a
8 There are various forms of schemes falling under this practice which are widely practiced around the
world. The forms discussed in this study pertain to forms that are widely used in South Africa. Some of
the forms practiced around the world include: gain-sharing schemes - these schemes are linked to
productivity rather than profitability; premium payment plans - distribute rewards according to
measured daily output and are designed to achieve desired standards of performance; merit-sharing
schemes - assess performance against standards set in specific work areas and workers are rewarded
periodically for their achievement in these areas; and productivity-sharing plans - these plans work on
a value-added basis, surpluses or a portion of surpluses being added to worker wages (Anstey, 1997).
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nominal status equality between employees and their managers. Furthermore, this
practice gives opportunities for plural ownership and social control of the industry.
This practice is discussed further in Chapter 3.
2.3.3.2 Profit-sharing schemes
Various factors lead to the adoption and maintenance of profit sharing and employee
ownership in companies. Some of the arguments for the adoption and advantages of
profit sharing and employee ownership are their ability to reduce workplace conflict
and improve company performance. Kruse (1996) adds that profit sharing also assists
in reducing unemployment and layoffs, and employee ownership can broaden the
distribution of wealth. Profit-sharing schemes introduce employees to an economic
stake in the company (Grant, 1998b). According to Hyman and Mason (1995), the
property ownership nexus forms the basis of the premise that a community of interest
can be forged between capital and labour.
Lin et al (2001) state that profit sharing can shift the economy into a state of excess
demand for labour. One of the motives behind profit-sharing schemes is motivating
the workers by encouraging workers' identification with the company they work for,
leading to higher productivity (Meade, 1972; Wadhwani & Wall, 1990). In a non-
participative system, workers' extra effort put into their work only benefit the
managers, as there are no incentives for the workers. They could make a minimum
effort just to keep their jobs instead of working towards promoting profitability of the
company.
In profit-sharing schemes, workers could put extra effort into their work knowing that
the benefits accrues for both the manager and them (Lin et al., 2001). An even greater
incentive for the labour force would be when they don't only share profit but have
profit-linked property in their profit-sharing system.
The positive arguments for profit-sharing schemes include the following:
(1) Profit sharing can increase wage flexibility," reducing unemployment during
9 The efficiency wage theory emphasises that the worker's effort is related to the payment system and
working conditions, including the wage, unemployment rate, unemployment benefits and the like. It
also assumes that firms posses market power to set wages. Hence, if [urns believe that a lower wage
would significantly reduce work effort, it may be profitable for them to lower their wages in the
presence of mass unemployment.
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recession. Weitzman (1987) shares this view by stating that profit sharing can
act as a great equaliser of workers' income. He further adds that in a free-
access profit-sharing system, this will result in equal pay for equal work in all
firms, and no unemployment.
(2) A profit-sharing economy will always display an excess demand for labour.
(3) These schemes stimulate increased efforts from the labour force.
There is a clear correlation between the efforts of the workers to promote productivity
and the ratio of their share in the company. According to Lin et al. (2001), these
motivations for profit-sharing systems have negative results in studies conducted on
profit-sharing companies. Out of 26 surveys, approximately 10 percent of the
surveyed indicated a negative response on the workers' efforts with the sharing ratio.
Only 30 percent in other surveys showed a correlation between effort and share ratio.
Lin et al. (2001) poses the question "what precisely are the economic forces that
motivate a firm to choose to be a profit-sharing rather than a fixed-wage, or even a
pure-sharing one?"
Czarnecki (1970), discussing the negative arguments for profit-sharing schemes,
writes that there is no guarantee that the company will earn sufficient profit during
any year to add credit to the employee's retirement fund and provide extra
compensation in the form of bonus. He adds that these schemes may sometimes only
serve employers as a means to circumvent a wage increase that would have been
reasonably expected in the long run. Also employees' attitude towards the benefits of
profit sharing is usually more negative compared to other benefits" due to uncertainty
of the future profits of the company.
Profit sharing is sometimes seen as a 'reserved' future benefit, which makes it
difficult for employees to envisage their future benefits from the scheme. The nature
of profit-sharing practice makes it difficult to provide an assured benefit although it
could still be a legally protected benefit. Profit sharing gives an incentive to the firms
to tum outsider unemployed workers into insider employed workers through the
provision of inflation-free employment (Weitzman, 1987). Compared with a wage
company, profit-sharing companies want to hire more labour than it is actually able to
10 Czarnecki (1970) highlights this conclusion is taken from the studies done in companies that
practiced profit sharing.
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hire on the profit-maximising contract parameters that it has selected. On the other
hand, wage companies would want to hire as much labour as it is hiring under its
current wage contract. Hence, Weitzman (1985) concludes that "a profit-sharing
economy has some natural tendencies towards sustained, non-inflationary, marker-
oriented full employment".
Viljoen (1986) argues that a reason for the failure of this practice is the misconception
that "management is the application of a collection of processes, practices and
techniques rather than a total system of interacting activities built on a cohesive
corporate ideology". Disillusionment and malperformance arises when management
does not support any form of management, process or practice.
2.3.3.3 Employee-share ownership plans
According to Mostert (1993), this form of participation received most support in
South Africa. Employee-share ownership plans (ESOPs) are seemingly favoured in
many countries, as McDermott (1996) also observes that ESOPs has shown a growing
popularity in Canada since the 1980s, facilitated by legislation. Imbalances in wealth
and property ownership, which are one of the economic and social inequalities facing
the relations between employees and their employers, led to the introduction of
ESOPs by labour movements (Hyman & Mason, 1995). ESOPs are a form of
participation where employees are collectively involved in ownership and
administration of company shares. These employees could directly or totally own the
company they are working in.
Maller (1987) argues that this commonly occurs in cases where a company faces
bankruptcy or total closure, and workers buy all the shares, leading to a different
management and ownership of the company. Benefits from these plans are the
distribution of profits to the workers in the form of wages, as workers directly and
wholly own these companies. According to Conte and Tannenbaum (1978) this
distribution of funds has the advantage of reducing taxes although it has an effect of
depressing the conventional profit statement.
In a study conducted by McDermott (1996), companies that combined ESOP with
worker participation in decision making outgrew those that did not. Those companies
also experienced higher profit growth, higher net profit margins, higher productivity,
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higher return on average total equity and higher return on capital. Mostert (1993)
highlights that there is a lack of evidence connecting the performance of these
companies to ESOP practice.
McDermott (1996) writes that the major variation between profit sharing and ESOP
strategy in profits is the employee buyout. On the verge of bankruptcy a company
may implement ESOP strategy whereby workers are motivated by the impression that
they now own the company and hence improve productivity. This is usually
encouraged by promoting trust through elimination of time clocks, fewer supervisors
(promoting self-directed work groups) and instituting a justice and dignity provision
where employees are innocent until proven guilty under the terms of a new grievance
procedure.
This practice can also have negative repercussions, as some employees can end up
earning less than they were before. Thus, Kaarsemaker and Poutsma (2002) argue that
both profit-sharing schemes and employee share-ownership schemes siphon part of
the risks of the company to the employees. They add that the more risk-averse the
workers are due to the culture, the more financial participation schemes will be
present. Seemingly financial participation schemes can be expected in countries
where individualism, small power distance, weak uncertainty avoidance and
masculinity are characteristic of national cultures. Mostert (1993) said that profit-
sharing schemes and ESOPs are common in the financial sectors.
2.3.3.4 Team/group finance/bonus incentive schemes
According to Mostert (1993), these incentive schemes are widespread in
manufacturing industries. He states that the paramount objective of these schemes is
to improve economic performance and motivate workers through financial reward.
Thus workers receive rewards whenever production is increased, in that a bonus
would be paid when more units are produced per hour worked. These schemes use a
formula for calculating the ratio of units produced to hours worked, which is a
historical standard of production.
Mostert (1993) writes that there is seemingly a future for these types of schemes and
that suspicious trade unions are likely to negotiate a collective employee productivity
bonus rather than agreeing on an individual performance linked scheme. FUrstenberg
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(1982) suggests that these schemes can be used where isolating the input of individual
workers is difficult.
2.3.3.5 Individual performance incentive payment schemes
This type of incentive scheme is mostly practised by companies where there are no
trade unions or weak unions. These performance incentive payments are mostly for
sales related functions (such as commission) and at executive management levels
(performance related payment). In weakly unionised and non-unionised companies,
these schemes could be found at all levels of employees (Mostert, 1993). The same
basis of calculation as the one used in group bonus incentive schemes could be used
but modifying production units to cater for the sales and executive tasks.
2.3.3.6 Turn-key and build, operate and transfer schemes
According to Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b),11 tum-key and build, operate and
transfer schemes (BOT) are used to transfer public infrastructure to the state once they
are in operation after using the private sector to build and to operate the scheme. This
world-wide trend is based on saving time and costs achieved by private construction
and financing. The major argument for these is their ability to induce the private
sector to develop commercial farming operations which would be transferred to
disadvantaged groups once they are up and running.
This approach reduces the high transaction costs of new entrants entering the
commercial sector and increases the chances of previously disadvantaged groups
entering the commercial sector. It has been realised the major problems paralysing
these schemes are the operational and ownership problems. Bembridge (in
Ngqangweni & Van Rooyen, 1995b) notes that these problems arise due to poor
infrastructural alignment, such as inappropriate irrigation system design, the planting
of inappropriate varieties etc. The solution to these problems is hiring or contracting
an experienced commercial farmer with a proven track record.
IINgqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b) wrote extensively about the following schemes: turn-key and
build operate and transfer schemes (BOT), lease and buy schemes, share-milk schemes, agri-village
schemes, and contract farming and outgrower schemes. Hence, most of the work written about the
schemes reflects their views.
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When these operational problems have been solved the state would buy the operating
scheme at an agreed upon price and settle new growers. According to Ngqangweni
and VanRooyen (1995a), the benefits of these schemes include commercial finance
availability to finance these schemes, mobilisation of best local expertise, and the fact
that new entrants receive a proven, up and running system, thus the cash flow problem
between establishment and first harvest is better. It also reduces the overhead costs of
creating implementation capacity for the state.
2.3.3.7 Lease and buy schemes
There are various forms of lease and buy schemes. Simply defined these schemes
entail leasing out of land and equipment to workers with the option to buy at the end
of a certain period. The way in which this process would take place differs from
scheme to scheme. Workers could be expected to put down a certain amount of
money which could be non-refundable. Workers could receive financing from the
government for financing the option premium. There could also be a rental market to
support those who want to rent land. Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b) add that
rental costs could be lowered by providing legal support and standardised contracts.
2.3.3.8 Share-milk schemes
Share-milk schemes closely resemble lease and buy schemes. This form of
participation is mostly implemented in New Zealand, where workers initially rent a
herd and later buy the herd or part of it. The ultimate goal is to tum workers into new
commercial producers. Thus, these workers would rent a herd and ultimately become
part owners or full owners of the land or with the help of the original owner purchase
another farm.
2.3.3.9 Agri-village schemes
According to Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b), the main idea behind agri-
village schemes is to encourage an individual business or a group of farming business
to acquire and develop land for its employees. They further argue that this form of
participation is suitable for highly intensive farming areas, since labour is intensive
and the opportunity cost of agricultural land is high. Also, houses could be bought
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free-hold, through a combination of the current government housing grant and an
employer's housing subsidy scheme.
2.3.3.10 Contract farming and outgrower schemes
This is one of the most popular participation practices, especially between small cane
growers and sugar millers in South Africa. This could be a widespread practice if
government would give it the necessary support. Contract farming and outgrower
schemes could also be implemented in other areas such as the coffee, timber, tea, fruit
and vegetable industries (Ngqangweni & Van Rooyen, 1995b).
2.4 Chapter summary
Different companies at various managerial levels and with various intensions have
embraced the worker participation practice. However, one of the requirements for the
success of the practice is the company's intention for implementing worker
participation. Worker participation needs to be implemented with the right intentions
rather than trying to mend deteriorating relations between employers and their
employees. Thus it should not be used to solve existing problems but should be a tool
implemented to encourage and strengthen ongoing sound relations.
Seemingly there is agreement on the benefits expected from the implementation of
worker participation or 'empowerment' practice in most companies. These benefits
include improved worker morale, motivated workforce, improved working conditions,
and increased worker attachment to the operations of the company or enterprise,
reducing conflicts and disputes with management, thus leading to higher production
and profits for the company. It is widely found that these worker participation
practices are started under either deteriorating economic conditions or in some cases
poor employer-employee relations. Hence the practice is used to cushion economic
losses or to mend relations.
Conditions under which a certain practice would be employed mostly depend on the
objectives of management or all role players, as different forms of worker
participation seek to achieve different goals. Companies tend to choose a practice
according to the culture prevailing in the company. The presence of a union supported
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by a dominant managerial system plays a role III the implementation of an
empowerment practice (Grant, 1998b).
Although worker participation aims at improving the economic performance of
companies there, however, are certain conditions under which different practices
operate in different industries. Mostert (1993) highlights the importance of
implementing a practice in a favourable environment to enable positive results. These
conditions are crucial for the survival of worker participation schemes.
Farmworker participation schemes are no less different from other worker
participation schemes in relation to the required environment to allow smooth
operation of the scheme and thus yield positive results and achieve intended
objectives. Due to several problems experienced with the initiation, implementation
and operation of these schemes, perceptions regarding their ability to actually
empower workers are questioned. One of the reasons is the variety of factors playing
a role in determining the performance of farmworker equity-sharing schemes.
However, some of these factors, such as government policies, politics and climatic
conditions, are outside the control of the scheme.
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CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW OF FARMWORKER EQUITY-SHARING
SCHEMES
3.1 Introduction
One of the characteristic features of the South African labour market is the large
number of unskilled workers coupled with a low level of literacy, a relatively high
rural proportion of the population and a highly unemployed urban population. South
Africa has the world's most unequal income distribution, as measured by the Gini-
coefficient (University of Cape Town, 1995; Lipton et al, 1996). These characteristics
suggest serious constraints for development and empowerment.
Factors that drive other worker participation initiatives, such as the economic and
social imbalances mentioned by Hyman and Mason (1995), exist in South Africa.
These result in imbalances in wealth and property ownership, such as the skewed
property ownership realised in land tenure. Farmworker equity-sharing schemes are
meant to solve a relative number of past indifferences with the aim of increasing
production while transforming land ownership to the previously disadvantaged.
The intension of this chapter therefore is to discuss the conceptual framework of the
practice of farmworker equity-sharing schemes. Then an overview of the studies done
by other researchers regarding this practice will be presented, along with a discussion
of the perceptions of various role players involved in these schemes and in worker
participation in general.
3.2 The concept of farmworker equity-sharing schemes
In South Africa, farmworker equity-sharing schemes have the potential to address two
problems, namely social imbalances (associated with poor treatment and
empowerment of farmworkers) and economic imbalances (land inequality). Knight et
al. (2003) define equity-sharing schemes as a strategy which could be used to
redistribute farm assets to land beneficiaries while maintaining the validity of
commercial farming operations. Joint ventures tend to assist resource poor farmers to
weather the impact of the global agricultural sector. The key issue in this regard is that
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resource poor farmers have access to secure rights to land, which is a requisite for any
agricultural activity.
Farmworker equity-sharing schemes serve as but one of the many land reform
programmes 12 or models implemented by government and NGOs in an attempt to
redress socio-economic tensions and improve worker participation on farms. Property
rights and ownership of land and water for agricultural use are some of the issues
concerned with the existing distribution of rights and power in South Africa.
Farmworker equity-sharing schemes, with farmworkers as their main target group,
have been used in South Africa since democratisation. This system, formerly known
as the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), has been evolving, as its grant
was initially R15 000. Previously farmworkers received grants of about R16 000 per
household from the DLA to buy shares in a farm. The grant is now known as the Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development Grant (LRAD) and consists of a grant
and or loan ranging between R20 000 and R100 000 depending on the workers' own
contribution (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000).
These schemes have several benefits, such as that they economically empower the
previously deprived groups, broaden their access to assets and support systems (Nel et
al., 1995; Ngqangweni & Van Rooyen, 1995b; Hall et al., 2001). These benefits are
achieved through sharing responsibilities in management and giving shareholders
access to land and other farm assets with minimal costs as opposed to investing in a
new establishment or business venture.
For these schemes to generate free spirit between all parties involved, socio-cultural
and political conditions need to be favourable (Ngqangweni & Van Rooyen, 1995a).
Various schemes are employed to increase the participation of workers in decision
making and to capture their capacity for innovation. Authors such as Renton (1994),
Eckert et al. (1995), Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b), Knight and Lyne (2002)
and Lyne and Darroch (2003b) have written extensively about these schemes' benefits
for farmworkers, owners and the society as a whole. They identified some of these
benefits of farmworker equity-sharing schemes as follows:
12 The South African government has embarked on three land reform programmes in an attempt to
redress land ownership. These programmes are land redistribution, land restitution and land tenure
reform (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).
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3.2.1 Benefits for farmworkers
• Prospects of increased income and wealth
• Long-term employment security
• Advantages of low risk in the initial phase of entry into commercial farming
• Long-term financial planning, thus increasing workers' capital base
• Skills transfer and technical and managerial support of high quality
• Increased trust due to the long-term relations with the partner (known partner)
• Another form of saving for retirement
3.2.2 Benefits for owners
• Incentive for motivating farmworkers, improving productivity and
profitability, therefore leading to the attainment of specific business objectives
• Increased loyalty and more stable labour force
• Release of capital for alternative investment
• A greater awareness among workers of the company's operations
• Known partners
• Increased business harmony
• Can keep the fixed component of wage costs at a lower level than would
otherwise be the case
• Help to attract (financial) support and retain key staff
• A contribution to the former RDP (Rural Development Programme)
3.2.3 Benefits to society
• A model to achieve redistribution goals
• Leveraging of state funds
• No additional costs to the state as technical, managerial support and extension
services are provided by the private sector
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• Empowerment of new entrants
Despite the advantages of farmworker equity-sharing schemes, disadvantages for the
farm owner/manager(s) and farmworkers also exist. These disadvantages include a
loss of decision autonomy and lower total share in profits (although the return on
capital could increase). Disadvantages for farmworkers include exposure to farming
risk and joint decision-making mechanisms (McKenzie, 1993). Renton (1994) adds
that other factors outside the boundaries of the scheme could lead to a reduction in the
company's share price. Other disadvantages are that workers risk losing their jobs and
also a major portion of their capital - which can include life savings and grants - in
cases where there is a total failure of the scheme.
The inability of shareholders to sell their shares in their own discretionary due to
statutory prohibitions on insider share trading could also pose a problem. Ngqangweni
and Van Rooyen (1995b) add that participation schemes can only work if benefits are
accrued for both partners in the project through synergy and to the economy at large.
Various studies conducted in the past have resulted in mixed views about the benefits
of these schemes. Studies done by the SPP on schemes in the Western Cape and
Mpumalanga criticise the reasonableness of such schemes. These studies regard these
schemes as a convenient way for commercial farmers to leverage cheap capital,
increase productivity and eliminate strike action (Fast, in Knight & Lyne, 2002).
Other studies, such as the one by Eckert et al. (1995), indicate the positive role of
equity-sharing schemes. Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995a) conclude from their
studies done on Western Cape fruit farms and in the Eastern Transvaal that
farmworkers ' perceptions of the schemes were positive, although these farmworkers
were concerned about their awareness of the arrangement.
3.2.4 Key issues for success
In order to ensure successful implementation of worker participation schemes in
general several aspects need to be considered to ascertain the survival of the schemes
in the long run. According to Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995b), case studies and
projects done by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) have aided
identification of necessary success issues.
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3.2.4.1 Sellers' motives
The motive behind the establishment of a worker participation scheme should be
based on plausible economic motives. These schemes are not supposed to be used as
easy access to capital or as a last resort to save an illiquid and insolvent business.
Worker participation schemes should, however, be used for an improvement in the
productivity and stability in the internal environment of the farm business.
3.2.4.2 Existing social and business relationships
Worker participation schemes should not be used to manage unpleasant relationships
but should be used in a logical progression from existing sound relationships. One of
the aims of these schemes is economic empowerment of farmworkers through
creating access to wealth and empowerment in the workplace with regard to newly
aligned relationships. Anstey (1990) argues that these schemes have been
implemented when job security and organisational survival had to be addressed. He
further states that there are four forces that shape up the South African labour
relations, namely the unique historical, social, political and economic forces.
3.2.4.3 The empowerment process
The establishment of a participation scheme on a farm is an important process, which
requires a great deal of attention. From the initiation of the scheme, farmworkers need
to be trained and consulted in order to understand what the scheme means to them. In
order to enable the farmworkers (uninformed buyers) to make an informed choice and
to negotiate on equal balance with the land owner (informed seller), a buyer's support
agent, with a mandate to advise the farmworkers with regard to all facets of the
proposal, is required. A willing buyer in a participation scheme not only implies
informed decisions but also a collective decision. However, choice by the individual
farmworker to take part or remain outside the scheme should be provided for.
The worker's democracy needs to be emphasised as this could affect the success of
these schemes. For example, 250 farmworkers were given three hectares as an
incentive to produce their own wine on a wine-producing farm (Simonsig Wine Farm
in Stellenbosch). Instead of producing wine, these workers chose to use the land to
produce grass which they considered less risky than wine (Lombard, 2003).
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3.2.4.4 Financial viability
In the studies done by Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995a) on the fruit farms in the
Western Cape, farmworkers felt that the schemes were initiated in the rise of financial
problems. Another important factor contributing to the failure of these schemes is
that, in cases where the market value of the farm involved is higher than the
productive" value, the farm is suppose to be sold at a discount to the market value
(Nel et al., 1995).
3.2.4.5 Loan security
Nel et al. (1995) writes that, in cases were farmworkers take loans to buy into the
farm; they usually need mortgages for security. This security usually does not
normally come from the workers as mortgage on the farm is usually insufficient,
which requires bonding over moveable assets. The value of security required will in
cases exceed the pro-rata workers' share of the fixed and moveable assets, thus
causing the owner to have no full benefit of the pro-rata share of assets to pledge as
security for ventures outside the participation scheme.
3.2.4.6 Percentage participation
The farmworkers ' percentage share in the farm to an extent depicts the benefits these
farmworkers would accrue from the arrangement. Most projects implemented ranges
from 50:50 to less than 20 percent share (Nel et al., 1995). The advantage of 50:50
joint ventures is less additional need for protection over the scheme, so there is
commitment from both sides encouraged by the equal status between the workers and
management.
3.2.4.7 Number ofparticipants
A reasonable number of workers are necessary for a meaningful farmworker equity-
sharing scheme. Usually farmworker equity-sharing schemes are valid for capital-
intensive agriculture with a high labour requirement. The model usually suits
particular instances, such as where the farming unit is indivisible due to technical,
managerial and natural resource constraints (McKenzie, 1993).
13 Some authors call this agricultural value (Lombard, 1999).
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3.2.4.8 Agrarian reform policies
The objectives of the agrarian reform policy should aim at equitable development and
fundamental issues of productivity, food security, entitlements, and safety-net for the
rural poor. Nel et al. (1995) writes participation schemes can satisfactorily contribute
to rural welfare as part of a programme where opportunities, wealth and employment
are equitably distributed.
3.2.5 Institutional arrangements
Knight et al. (2003) believe that there is a positive relation between sound
institutional arrangements, competent management, effective worker empowerment
(e.g. skills transfer and gender representation) and good farmworker equity-sharing
scheme performance. Furthermore, their analysis suggests that farmworker equity-
sharing schemes should be operated as (or like) a company with voting and benefit
rights proportional to individual shareholdings.
In order to prevent free-riding by non-workers and the loss of creditworthiness
through sudden outflows of equity and managerial expertise, restrictions on certain
share transactions need to be implemented. The relationship between institutional
arrangements, worker empowerment and management and the overall performance of
the farmworker equity-sharing schemes is represented in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the critical role that management plays in the performance of the
equity-sharing scheme. Management is responsible for putting in place sound
institutional arrangements to ensure effective worker empowerment. In tum these
institutional arrangements affect the management, as illustrated by the arrows coming
from both directions.
Knight et al. (2003) writes that institutional arrangements have a direct and indirect
effect on the performance of farmworker equity-sharing schemes. These institutions
are also inversely influenced by the quality of management. Thus, transfer of skills to
empower worker shareholders and promoting good corporate performance are critical
roles played by managers. The hiring of an external auditor is one of the practices
promoting good corporate performance hence promoting trust by all role players.
Nieuwoudt (in Knight & Lyne, 2003) states that joint ventures require decisive and
accountable management for financial performance.
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Effective worker
empowerment
Good project
performance
Figure 3.1: Empirical constructs of a farmworker equity-sharing scheme
Source: Knight et al. (2003)
Companies do not operate in a vacuum; there are other factors, which are crucial to
the survival of these schemes. Some of these factors are totally outside the control of
the scheme. These factors include government and industry policies, and the industry
under which the company operates, such as the deciduous fruit sector or the citrus
fruit sector.
The total environment under which equity-sharing schemes operate is illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
\
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual model of factors contributing to the performance of
farmworker equity-sharing schemes
Sources: Knight et al. (2003) and Roth (2003)
35
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
According to Knight et al. (2003), the left-hand side of Figure 3.2 identifies strategic
points of policy and programme interventions that impinge directly or indirectly on
the company. Knight et al. (2003) write that a favourable macro-policy environment
will aid the performance of even a badly designed company while a poor environment
(currently the deciduous fruit sector, for example) will constrain' the performance of a
well-designed project.
These factors sometimes affect the scheme negatively or positively. For example, the
macroeconomic environment, which is influenced by domestic policy and global
trade, will have an important bearing on the profitability of the enterprise regardless
of its institutional and organisational features.
According to Knight et al. (2003), a favourable institutional environment combined
with an enabled management and workforce, ceteris paribus, should improve the
operating efficiency of the enterprise, thereby increasing demand for, and the
profitability of, fixed improvements and complementary inputs. Thus, failures could
result due to poor external environments, lack of political support or even an internal
conflict and lack of individual incentives.
According to De Haan and Werter (in Roth & Lyne, 2002), collectivisation in
Columbia resulted in a state of indebtedness and poor economic results, and poorly
maintained infrastructure on collective farms stemming from lack of members' ability
to manage a collective enterprise (pool resource problems), free rider problems, lack
of credit, technology choice inconsistent with beneficiary's interests and skills left
beneficiaries uncommitted.
Karaan (2003) highlights that these schemes are also subject to institutional
incompleteness. This incompleteness stems from lack of verifiability related to social
capital, embeddedness, governance and micro-performance. In addition, they lack the
requisite ex ante incentives to enable ex post adaptation, counterveilance over
opportunism, and the distribution of residual claims and control.
He further states that the first reason for incompleteness emanates from the motivation
of the initiators, which is opportunism by landowners to secure their assets in the face
of uncertainty and/or enhance their returns in the marketplace. The lack of worker
effort and options in the early stages raises credible commitment questions and
examining the governance aspects of equity schemes reveal that they are consistent
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with modem trends to separate ownership and control. However, according Karaan
(2003), a key concern is the asymmetry in human capital and subsequently in power,
residual control, gratification, and ultimately economic empowerment.
3.2.6 Scenarios for farmworker equity-sharing schemes
Different operational arrangements exist within the farmworker equity-sharing
scheme practice. These arrangements determine the way in which a scheme would be
operated and define to a certain extent the distribution of power and decision-making
within the scheme. These arrangements could be influenced by the initial process of
implementation, negotiated terms between the different parties and the type of
shareholding and business. Shareholding can also determine the level of influence of
each role player in the overall operation of the scheme. Added to this is the
representation of all role players in the decision-making committees, such as the
board of directors. Below are some of the forms farmworker equity-sharing schemes
could take.
The landowner (farmer) and the farmworkers (the farmworkers own a share of the
Land Holding Company) could jointly own the Land Holding Company. They form a
partnership to purchase a neighbouring farm, or the farmworkers acquire shares in the
existing farm. The two parties then enter into a joint venture or equity scheme and
establish an Operating Company on the farm (The Land Reform Policy Committee
PC.Doc.9/1997).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the representation of different role players involved in this
particular scheme. There are various players making up the new operating company,
namely the original farm owner, the farmworkers and the financial institution. Mostly
farmworkers' shares are organised in a trust and usually they get funds from the
LRAD grant to finance the purchase of their shares. Shareholding differs significantly
from farm to farm.
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Figure 3.3: An example of the organisational arrangement of an equity-sharing
scheme
Source: Adapted from Anon (2003)
3.3 Farmworker livelihood and experiences with equity-sharing schemes in
South Africa
This section provides an overview of the characteristic features and livelihood of
farmworkers in South Africa. In order to understand the need and the way these
schemes would affect farmworkers ' socio-economic conditions, the focus is on their
background and the relations between them and the farms they work for. Further on,
workers' experiences with farmworker equity-sharing schemes and worker
participation schemes, based on case studies, are discussed.
3.3.1 A brief overview offarmworker livelihoods in South Africa
Several studies have been conducted about the conditions under which South African
farmworker experience. Most studies have indicated poor working and living
conditions under which farmworkers lived hence their livelihoods have been
negatively affected. The prolonged exploitative control legacy has left physiological,
social and institutional barriers for the majority of farmworkers in South Africa. This
has led to farmworkers categorised amongst the poorest group of workers,
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characteristic of poor living standards, poverty, and an extreme difference of power
between the farmer and the worker and between men and women (Husy & Samson,
2001).
The labour force in the agricultural sector is predominantly black with low levels of
education (Orkin & Njobe, 2000; Hall et ai, 2001). According to the Census '96 their
income was R 500 and less however, the introduction of the minimum wage standards
in 2004 required that all farmers pay their workers R 800.00 for workers in areas
where average household income is more than R24 000 per annum and R650 for
workers where average household income is less than R24 000 per annum.
Some of the challenges faced by these workers can be attributed to the paternalistic
relationship culture that prevailed on farms (South African Human Rights
Commission, 2003). This phenomenon has been sustained by, amongst other factors,
the locations of the farms, as most farms are situated in remote areas. Some of the
workers spend almost their entire lives living and working on these farms and
sometimes have their children growing up and working on the same farms, resulting
in farm life being their only experience. These are some of the scars left by the past
government regime. The present government has responded in various ways to solve
these problems.
Different farms offer different fringe benefits, such as paid sick leave, maternity
leave, work pension, water in houses and study bursaries. However, farmworkers in
some parts of the country are still experiencing ill-treatment from their employers.
The following statement highlights some of the concerns people have about the life
and circumstances of farmworkers in South Africa.
"One man's family has worked for afarmer for three generations, hard, physical
labour every day. This man has worked since his birth for the same farmer but has
nothing, no savings, not even a bicycle. These people can afford nothing. " (Poverty
and the labour market, 1996).
The above statement was made by a farmworker foreman in the Eastern Cape in 1995
(Poverty and the labour market, 1996). Tregurtha & Vink (2001) found that
farmworkers in South Africa still share many economic characteristics with
unemployed people living in the peri-urban areas of the country and are, in nutritional
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terms, worse off than even the rural unemployed. However, they also acknowledge
that these workers enjoy relative good housing conditions.
Farmworker equity-sharing schemes is but one of the solutions that could assist these
workers in improving their livelihoods. In 1997, government made an attempt to
improve the conditions under which farmworkers lived and worked by passing a law"
that meant to cater for farmworkers, namely The Extension of Security of Tenure Act
(ESTA). The main objectives of ESTA are: to provide measures with state assistance
to facilitate long-term security of land tenure, to regulate the conditions of residence
on certain land, to regulate the conditions or circumstances under which the right of
persons to reside on land may be terminated and to regulate the conditions and
circumstances under which persons whose right to residence has been terminated may
be evicted from land and to provide for matters connected therewith (The Extension
of Security of Tenure ACT, 2004).
Other drivers of the values and principles of equity enshrined in our constitution
include The Broad-Black Economic Empowerment Strategy. This strategy was
developed in order to address the systematic exclusion of the majority of South
Africans from full participation in the economy (Department of Trade and Industry,
2005). The exclusion of the blacks from economic power through underdevelopment
resulted into landless black majority, poor developmental skills and other
disempowerments.
South Africa's economic transformation therefore seeks to redress imbalances, abet
inclusion of a majority of blacks into the economy through new laws that have
restored rights to land and tenure, prescribing unfair discrimination and to introduce
specific active measures to overcome distortions in the labour market (Department of
Trade and Industry, 2005). Agriculture as one of the most affected economic powers
has adopted its own Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Strategy, the
AGRIBEE framework. The main aim of the framework is to facilitate and speed up
inclusion of the majority of blacks in the agricultural sector. Their inclusion should be
as owners, managers, professionals, skilled employees and consumers therefore
14 Several other laws aimed at protecting workers as a whole were passed in South Africa. These laws
include: The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), The Compensation for Occupational
Injuries Diseases Act (COIDA), The Labour Relations Act (LRA) and The Employment Equity Act
(EEA). ESTA was the only law that emerged specifically to protect farmworkers.
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eliminating the skewed participation and inequality in the sector (Department of
Agriculture,2004a).
3.3.2 Experiences from farmworker equity-sharing schemes
A number of farmworker equity-sharing schemes currently exist in South Africa.
These equity-sharing schemes are in different stages of their establishment and
operation. Several schemes continue to prosper while other schemes had to be
liquidated. The causes of the success and failure of these schemes is of interest to
various parties. This has lead to major research undertaken by a number of
researchers. The results from some of the investigations are documented below.
According to the study by the Surplus People Project (1999) on farmworker equity-
sharing schemes in the Western Cape and Mpumalanga," the major reason for the
workers' participation in the scheme was to provide for their children. In a study by
Lyne and Darroch (2003b), it was found that the main reason farmworkers engage in
equity-sharing schemes is the opportunity to influence decisions affecting wages,
working conditions, housing and tenure security for their families. However,
expectations of the beneficiaries are not always met. Beneficiaries voiced their
concern on the lack of visible benefits such as increased income or improved living
conditions.
The study by the SPP further indicated that there are problems that need to be solved
in some of these schemes before they could operate effectively.
3.3.2.1 Assessment of equity-sharing schemes by farm owners/manager(s)
A study conducted by Lastarria-Cornhiel (2001) found that there is tremendous
variation between farm owners/manager(s) and farmworkers on the level of
enthusiasm and commitment to equity-sharing businesses. The majority of farm
owners/manager(s) expressed their agreement for the need to improve farmworkers'
income, living standards and social status. They realise that equity-sharing schemes
are an appropriate means for attaining these objectives. The need to empower workers
15 The schemes that were involved in the investigation were from Mpumalanga: Hoogland Chickens cc
and Ebukhosini. In the Western Cape Whitehall and Warmwater were investigated.
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and to integrate them into the management of the farm operation was regrettably only
realised by a small minority of farm owners/manager(s).
3.3.2.2 Assessment of equity-sharing schemes by farmworkerslshareholders
The majority of farmworkers/shareholders are not certain about the operations of
farmworker equity-sharing schemes and hence their enthusiasm is low. Lastarria-
Cornhiel (2001) writes that farmworkers/shareholders are still not sure about their
rights as shareholders and the terms set out in the trust deed or company shareholding
document. They feel inferior to fellow shareholders who are farm owner(s).
Farmworkers also feel that their real say in the management of the farm operation is
null and void.
Lastarria-Cornhiel (200 1) concludes that it would seem that the problem is the
insufficient level of training the farmworkers/shareholders receive. To compensate for
this deficiency some schemes hire or contract more training workshops for their
farmworkers/shareholders additional to the training received through the LRAD
programme. This training results in improved knowledge and understanding of the
operations of farmworker equity-sharing schemes.
The level of farmworkers' enthusiasm and interest in the schemes vary greatly. On the
one hand, some are anxious to see the tangible benefit of these schemes, while on the
other hand, others feel it would take some years before they could reap tangible
benefits from the scheme.
3.3.2.3 Problems experienced by workers (beneficiaries)
The SPP did a study of a number of farmworker equity-sharing schemes, evaluating
beneficiaries' experiences with these schemes. Most of the experiences discussed
below are drawn from the SPP study:
• Due to the complexity of equity-sharing schemes, farmworkers did not
understand all the options proposed by these schemes. In some cases land
reform and housing options were not always fully explained to them. Further,
equity schemes were found to limit residential and employment mobility.
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• In the initial stages farmworkers did not participate in decisions impacting on
the financial and legal arrangements of the schemes. Ngqangweni and Van
Rooyen (1995a) add that workers tend to lack understanding of their new role
as shareholders once the scheme is up and running. However, the situation
usually improves as far as the day-to-day running of the scheme is concerned.
• There is a lack of communication between farmworkers and their employers.
Distribution of a 'Worker's Handbook', which is meant to improve
communication between workers and farmers, does not always solve the
problem (Eckert, et al. 1995).
• Due to a long history of social, economical and political dominance by
employers, these farmworkers find it difficult to take responsibility. Patronage
and dependency are still entrenched in the farmworkers even though they are
beneficiaries.
• A lack of capacity to engage in meaningful decision making and a lack of
understanding of the financial statements are some of the major setbacks
experienced by beneficiaries. Thus there is a need to link the development of
skills with the transfer of responsibilities. Training has to cater for skills
development with regard to all aspects rather than production skills only.
• In all the schemes investigated, labour relations were good and improving
except for one scheme where labour relations were characterised by high
levels of conflict.
• There are differences in the treatment of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in
the schemes. These differences include access to training, which is only
provided to beneficiaries who are also pressured to work harder for the success
of the scheme.
• Gender relations only seem to focus on the workers' legal entity as promoting
and protecting women's interests and ignoring their economic interests
evidenced by discriminatory wage structures.
• In respect to tenure security, workers feel more secure and have a better
understanding of the rules relating to entry/exit. However, they are insecure
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about the future. A lack of individual personal share certificates is an example
of a cause of insecurity.
3.3.2.4 Positive experiences from the schemes
The study conducted by Knight and Lyne (2002) indicated more positive results
regarding these schemes. The study included four other schemes not investigated by
the SPP. Unlike the SPP study, Knight and Lyne's study covered most of the role
players rather than concentrating on a certain interest group. Some of the study's
findings are as follows:
• A great networking exercise exists among different workers from different
schemes. This networking included visits to other worker-
shareholderslbeneficiaries to share experiences and attend workshops.
• Workers enlisted the services of a private accountant to help them understand
the financial implications of the project and to advise them accordingly. Eckert
et al. (1995) found that workers knew what would happen to their shares in
case they wanted to leave the scheme.
• Trustees had a clear understanding of the operations of the workers' trust.
• There was a high level of enthusiasm about the involvement in the schemes.
Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen (1995a) state that farmworkers generally have a
positive response about the schemes.
• Trustees felt that they could improve working conditions if they chose to (and
perceived this as one of the benefits of the farmworker equity-sharing
scheme). Eckert et al. (1995) found that there was a high level of satisfaction
about the wages and the conditions of employment amongst the workers.
• Because of the knowledge of the farm's financial status workers felt that
demands for wage increases could jeopardise their own investment in the long
run.
• Benefits like improved housing and free transport are some of the reasons for
workers' enthusiasm about being worker-shareholders.
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• However, there are still problems concerning communication, especially in
financial reporting and the inability to influence financial and operational
decisions. Only in one scheme did workers believe that they could influence
financial and operational decisions.
• In five schemes all worker-shareholders received training in the interpretation
of financial statements. In three other schemes only the chairperson of the
trustees received extensive training to enable himlher to report and interpret
these statements.
• Worker-shareholders received training on a number of issues, such as
identification of shareholders, shareholder rights and obligations, election and
voting procedures, distribution of benefits, interpretation of financial
statements, general business skills and life skills.
• In six of the schemes trustees stated that labour relations were excellent or
good.
• There are female shareholders in 63 percent of the schemes, 50 percent are
shareholders in their own names receiving special attention in some of the
schemes. However, wage differences are still evident since men are earning
higher salaries.
• Provisions for voluntary and involuntary exit were well defined in the
shareholders' agreement. The entry and exit conditions were also detailed in
the workers' trust deed.
• According to Knight et al. (2003), the manager(s) in a certain project
encouraged semi-skilled workers to start a business with tractors purchased
with loans, resulting in farmworkers hiring out tractors to the equity-sharing
scheme, hence starting another business. In some cases management would
introduce training courses which dealt with general life skills, such as family
planning, budgeting, dealing with alcoholism and overcoming domestic
violence. This training supplements basic training in technical, financial and
leadership subjects associated with good governance.
• The SPP report in some cases identified workers' benefits such as reduced or
low levels of conflict and improvement in labour relations.
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• The gender distribution of men and women in the equity-sharing schemes in
the Western Cape is fairly equal, with an ethnic composition consisting of a
coloured majority and a Xhosa minority (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2001).
• The micro-environment (or on-farm environment) has historically established
respect between farmer and worker and has been favourable (Ngqangweni and
Van Rooyen, 1995a).
• There has been political involvement in negotiations to establish acceptability
of these schemes (Ngqangweni and Van Rooyen, 1995a).
3.4 Chapter summary
The SPP conducted their research on several aspects, such as worker participation
during the establishment of the scheme, beneficiaries' expectations, relations of power
and skills transfer (between the worker-shareholders and the manager or original
owner), labour relations, position of non-beneficiaries, gender relations, issues of
tenure security and entry/exit aspects. It has been found that these schemes still face
major problems.
The empowerment of farmworkers is hindered by many factors, ranging from the
quality of management to personal attributes such as workers' entrenched pattern of
patronage and dependency, which makes it harder for them to make meaningful
contributions to managerial decisions. The lack of expertise also disables these
workers in playing a role in the operations of the scheme.
These schemes, however, do make positive contributions towards the livelihoods of
the beneficiaries, although the SPP's research has found that these are minimal. The
SPP study only concentrated on the workers with minimal management comments.
Therefore it does not present a holistic overview of all the role players involved in the
schemes.
The studies conducted by Eckert et al. in 1995 and Knight and Lyne in 2001 showed
contradicting results for the same equity-sharing schemes. Their studies found that
seven out of eight schemes conducted in-depth workshops with prospective
beneficiaries to select an appropriate legal entity, to define rules of their association
and to discuss the project structure (Knight & Lyne, 2002).
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The study by Knight and Lyne showed more positive results, although it included all
the schemes investigated by the SPP as well as four other schemes. The differences in
the findings could also be attributed to the scope of the research. Knight and Lyne
included most of the role players in these schemes (but excluded worker-
shareholders) rather than concentrating on a certain interest group in interviewing.
They conclude that this form of participation will never satisfy everyone's view of
land reform. And they acknowledge that there are still areas that need to be improved
on to make these schemes favourable and appealing to the workers. Ngqangweni and
Van Rooyen (1995a) add that there needs to be a certain socio-cultural or political
base for the proposal of these schemes.
It would seem that these schemes also face institutional problems. Best institutional
practices identified by Knight et al. (2003) suggest that equity-sharing schemes
should be operated as companies with voting and benefit rights proportional to
individual shareholdings and that companies must comply with legal requirements
that promote financial transparency and accountability. There should be restrictions
on certain share transactions to prevent free-riding problems by non-workers and the
loss of creditworthiness through sudden outflows of equity and managerial expertise.
Thus the ability of the farms to attract and retain experienced personnel and private
financiers is one of the advantages realised by the implementation of equity-sharing
schemes.
The ability of farmworkers to recognise that they are being empowered is usually
compromised by entrenched patronage and dependency, expressed as poor
participation in decision-making. In addition to this poor literacy of workers is a
problem which seems to impede most meaningful contributions they could make to
their scheme. The power possessed by the farmers is another contributing factor to the
poor level of participation and transfer of skills.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHOD, RESEARCH AREA AND DESCRIPTION OF FARMS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a brief description of the research plan followed in this
study. The implementation of the plan, collection of data and the data analysis are
described. This is followed by a brief overview of the research area and a description
of the surveyed farms.
4.2 Developing the research plan
Kotler (1997) suggests four basic steps to be followed in research. These steps are
represented in Figure 4.1.
Define the problem
and research
objectives
c::> Develop the
research plan
c:::::> Collect the
information
Analyse the
information
Figure 4.1: The research plan
Source: Kotler (1997)
4.2.1 Limitations of the study
The study was limited to the farmworker equity-sharing schemes administered by the
Department of Land Affairs of the Worcester regional office. The decision was
reached after the schemes administered by the Cape Town offices of the Department
of Land Affairs were being evaluated these were the only two offices administering
the schemes in the Western Cape.
This Worcester region included the magisterial districts of Ceres, Grabouw and some
farms in Paarl. In total there were about nine equity-sharing schemes under the
Worcester regional office. It was decided that the study would evaluate schemes that
were in operation for at least two years. Some schemes were in the process of
liquidation but met the necessary requirements and some were in the process of
transition into worker-owned schemes.
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In order to capture the perceptions of the role players in these schemes, they were
included in this study. The financial evaluation of the schemes is limited to the
financial statements received from the managers. Schemes that were less than two
years in operation, undergoing liquidation and/or managerial transition could not
provide any financial statements; hence, their financial statements could not be
evaluated. Some of the schemes had their statements with forensic auditors.
4.2.2 Sampling method and data collection
Five farms administered by the Worcester regional office of the DLA were included
in this study. The office provided a list of farms that matched the desired criteria. Four
farms were identified. A fifth farm was included because it had a totally different
form of equity-sharing scheme. It was planned that these farms would be visited.
However, two of these farms were liquidated and one farm underwent transition
during the study process. This resulted in certain changes in the initial planning. Five
farms were visited, evaluated and the results presented as case studies.
To obtain a desired sample of responses on each farm, random sampling was used.
During the visits, personal interviews were conducted with all categories of
farmworkers and the manager or original farm owner. The objectives of the study
were presented and explained to respondents." Thus the data collection process
encouraged the participants to participate with informed consent. They were aware
that their participation was voluntary and were not persuaded by anyone to
participate.
4.2.2.1 Survey instrument
The study made use of structured questionnaires to collect the required data for
evaluation. Four different questionnaires were developed and administered to the
different categories of role players on the farms, namely the manager/former farm
owner, the committee, shareholders and non-shareholders. (See Appendices A to D
for the questionnaires).
16 Furlong et al (2000) argue that deception naturally violates the basic principle of informed consent
because the participants do not know the true purpose of the experiment and perhaps not the true risks
involved.
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4.2.2.2 Description of the survey instrument
The four structured questionnaires had various questions focusing on the intended
audience. The intension of the questionnaire was to gain the perceptions of all the
different role players. Some questions focused on the establishment of the farmworker
equity-sharing schemes and the respondents' feelings regarding the scheme. Other
questions focused on the changes that have occurred on the farm since the
implementation of the scheme and how those changes, education and housing issues
were perceived. Lastly, there were questions focusing on the financial aspects of the
farm. The questionnaire was focused on finding out whether these farmworker equity-
sharing schemes improved the operational, social and economic conditions on the
farm.
4.2.2.3 Problems experienced during data collection
Language differences played an important role in data collection. In some cases
respondents requested explanation in their home languages, which was Afrikaans (to a
greater extent) and Xhosa (to a lesser extent). This required an interviewer with a
good understanding of the questionnaire and a working knowledge of the two
languages. Other problems experienced during data collection included the
unavailability of most workers due to the prevailing conditions on the farm at that
moment, such as liquidation of the farm or workers busy working the fields. These
circumstances made it hard for the researcher to follow the sampling method as in
some instances the chosen participants weren't available. There were times when
interviews could only be conducted during lunch time or in the fields in order to
minimise the disruption of their work schedule.
4.2.3 Data analysis
Data was analysed using the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) to run the
frequency analysis of the variables. The Centre for Statistical Consultation of the
University of Stellenbosch was consulted to assist in determining the procedures for
data collection and the data was analysed with their assistance.
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4.2.3.1 Financial performance measures
The approach taken by this evaluation is that one cannot deduce from the financial
statements alone whether a project is going to be successful or not. The main purpose
of this section is to outline the various techniques used to measure a business's
financial performance and the precautions needed in the process of choosing a more
suitable technique to measure the desired performance. Certain precautions need to be
taken in order to achieve the desired goal of this exercise. A company's financial
statements are documents showing the monetary operations of a company. Farm
Financial Standards Council (2003), point out that these statements are the
quantifications of reality in financial terms. Since farm records alone are not enough
to evaluate a farm's financial status or to enable a diagnostic analysis, supplementary
information such as the industry norms or standards of the business enterprise is
necessary to compare the performance of the farm enterprise with. Harsh et al (1981),
state that, the performance of a farm would be judged against a corresponding norm
or standard to determine the disparity between the performance indicator of the farm
and that of the norm.
Financial analysis of an agricultural business must focus on both its present position
(called 'financial position')" and the results of operations and past financial decisions
(called 'financial performance')" (Farm Financial Standards Council, 2003).
Financial performance measures vary across different types of farms. When farm
records can be used to quickly analyse prevailing conditions and reach decisions,
these records are powerful tools to use in enhancement of farm profitability. Detailed
and accurate information is a necessary component of the farm manager's decision-
making process. For this reason good farm records are the foundation of good farm
management.
17 This refers to the total resources controlled by a business and total claims against those resources, at
a single specific point in time. Measures of fmancial position provide an indication of the capacity of
the business to withstand risk from future farming operations and provide a benchmark against which
to measure the results of future business decisions.
18 According to the Harvard Business Review (1998), fmancial performance measures indicate whether
the company's strategy, implementation and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement.
Measures of financial performance include the impact of external forces that are beyond anyone's
control (drought, grain embargoes, etc.) and the results of operating and fmancial decisions made in the
ordinary course of the business. Hence typical financial goals have to do with profitability, growth and
shareholder value.
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4.2.3.2 Primary tools for financial statement analysis
Harvard Business Review (1998), highlights that, there are vanous techniques
available to the analyst for measuring financial statements. The more common
analytical techniques include:
(1) Comparative financial statements and trend analysis
According to Barry et al (2000), this analysis is merely a representation of two or
more years of accounting statements. Comparative analysis is also known as 'trend
analysis' as it presents a trend observed over a number of years, allowing a
comparison of one farm to a similar one or to a norm or goal.
(2) Index-number analysis
Index-number analysis differs from comparative analysis in that successive years are
compared against a chosen base year, which is expressed as 100 percent (Samuels et
al, 1990).
(3) Common size analysis
This analysis uses an indexing procedure. In common size analysis, each item on a
financial statement is represented relative to a total value for a category of similar
items (Barry et al., 2000).
(4) Specific financial performance measures and ratio analysis
Financial ratios are an indication of the financial strength of a company. A ratio is not
particularly useful on its own; it has to be compared with something else, such as a
target or a norm (Samuels et ai, 1990). Ratios could be used to analyse the solvency,
liquidity, profitability, efficiency and net worth or owner's equity of a business.
Ratios, mathematically express as fractions, decimals or percentages, rate one item or
group of items in relation to another item or group of items. Kay (1981) adds that
ratio analysis is used because it provides a standard unit of measurement and permit
comparison over time and between firms of different sizes.
According to Bloom (2001), the primary information provided by financial ratios is
useful for analysing the business's financial performance and evaluating management
effectiveness, operational efficiency, productivity levels and the efficient use of
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capital. The information from financial ratios could also be used to determine future
profitability levels, earnings and cash flow potential of the enterprise.
4.2.3.3 Specific financial performance measures
According to the Farm Financial Standards Council (FFSC) there are five broad
categories in which financial measures could be grouped. These are profitability,
liquidity, solvency and financial efficiency. These financial measures measure either
the financial position or the financial performance of a business, and should be
meaningful and manageable (Barry et al., 2000). Harsh et al. (1981) write that there
are differing opinions on which records are necessary to carry out a business analysis.
There was consensus among the members of the FFSC that the minimum set of
financial statements required for financial analysis should include the following:
balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows and statement of owner
equity.
1. Profitability measures
The profitability of a farm business can be measured in a number of ways. According
to Van Zyl et al (1999), profitability is the percentage difference between the profit
earned in a given period and the capital used to realise that profit. This measure
provides an easier comparative analysis tool to compare farms with regard to their
profitability status, such as income in relation to investment. The widely used
profitability measures include net farm income (NFl) per R100 invested, rate of return
on farm assets (ROA), rate of return on farm equity (ROE) and operating profit
margin ratio. The three ratios mostly used to measure profitability are discussed
below.
l(a) Rate of return on farm assets (ROA)
ROA = Return on assets / Value of total assets
1(b) Rate of return on farm equity (ROE)
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ROE = Total returns to equity capital invested in the farm business / Farm business
net worth
l(c) Net Farm Income (NFl) per RIOD capital investment
NFl per RIOD capital investment = Net farm income / Average capital investment
multiplied by 100 / 1
2. Liquidity measures
Liquidity measures measure the ability of the business to generate cash needed to
meet cash obligations without seriously disrupting the production activities of the
business. Ellinger and Barry (1996) writes that although the farm business may be
operating at a profit and have a favourable net worth it could experience financial
problems if it cannot satisfy the financial claims against it as they fall due. They
further add that one could project the farm business's liquidity position by accurately
projecting the time pattern of cash outflow relative to the cash inflow. Penson and
Lins (1980) add that one of the best ways to measure the farm business's liquidity
position is by examining hislher cash flow statements. They further add that these
statements are often not available.
2(a) Current asset ratio (Current asset to current liabilities)
Current asset ratio = Current assets / Current liabilities
2(b) Acid test ratio
Acid test ratio = (Current assets - Stocks and supplies) / Current liabilities
2(c) Intermediate ratio
Intermediate ratio = (Total current assets + Medium-term assets) / (Total currents
liabilities +Medium-term liabilities)
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3. Solvency measures
Solvency measures measure whether the total assets are greater than total liabilities; if
they are not, the business is insolvent or technically bankrupt. Solvency deals with the
ability of the business to meet long-run claims. The farm business will be insolvent if
the sale of all assets fails to generate sufficient cash to payoff all liabilities. The main
focus of the measures of solvency is to look at whether the farm business is making
financial progress or not, and, more importantly, to reflect whether it is following a
projected schedule for generating new funds, making capital expenditures, repaying
debt and whether the business grows or not (Ellinger & Barry, 1996).
There are various ways to measure solvency. It could be computed from data received
from the balance sheet (Penson & Lins, 1980). According to Van Zyl et al (1999),
there are generally four methods most used to measure solvency.
3(a) Net capital ratio
Net capital ratio = Total assets / Total liabilities
3(b) Leverage ratio
Leverage ratio = Total liabilities / Net worth
4. Financial efficiency measures
Penson and Lins (2000) describe efficiency ratios as measures to evaluate the degree
to which the farm operator uses the resources at his disposal to achieve a desired goal
without wasting any resources and/or efforts. Kay (1981) discusses the following
ratios used in analysing important factors used to determine the financial progress of a
farm business.
4(a) Turnover ratio
Turnover ratio = Gross farm income / Total farm business assets owned and rented
4(b) Expense structure ratio
Expense structure ratio = Fixed cash expenses / Total cash expenses
55
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4(c) Gross ratio
Gross ratio = Total expenses / Gross farm income
4.3 Overview of the study area
Agriculture, with its economically and socially significant role, forms an important
pillar of the Western Cape economy. According to Vink (2003), the sector's
contribution to the Western Cape does not merely end in economic objectives, but
also in social and political objectives. In 2002's agricultural review, agriculture's
contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) was about 5.9 percent and it
contributed to 9.0 percent of employment. The province produces more than 20
percent of the total agricultural production of South Africa and the sector is growing
at a rate of five percent every year, accounting for 50 to 60 percent of South Africa's
exports. This growth is accompanied by a three percent annual growth in employment
(Department of Agriculture, 2004).
Currently there are about 8 500 commercial farmers in the province, 2 500 beginner
farmers and 220 000 farmworkers supporting about 1.5 million dependents. A
unskilled male dominated labour force with a relatively meagre education
characterises the lower level labour force found on farms. The agricultural sector
accounts for 13 percent of the formal job opportunities in the province (Department of
Agriculture, 2004). Until the minimum wage regulations were introduced
farmworkers received wages as little as R174 to R360 per month (Wesso, 1996). It is
estimated that about 19 percent of households are living in poverty (WESGRO, 2002).
Government, assisted by a number of interested organisations, has implemented
various programmes of land reform. These programmes include small farm-dependent
production schemes, sharecropping, inter-cropping and equity-sharing schemes. Other
existing options of tenure security that could be implemented is being debated
(Wesso, 1996). Initiatives such as farmworker training workshops are being
conducted around the province to assist the transformation of farmworkers into small
scale and future commercial farmers. Most importantly redistribution should not
compromise production over the long run. Initially the Western Cape Province had
about 17 380 hectares of state-owned land for distribution through the LRAD
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programme. In 2003 about 3 507,6 hectares had been allocated to 16 agricultural
projects in the province (Department of Agriculture, 2001).
4.4 Overview of the farms
This section provides an overview of the farms included in this study. The names of
the farms are withheld as it was agreed with them that their identity would be treated
as confidential. The study utilised the information received from the business plans
that the farms submitted to the DLA. One farm was now totally financed by a
commercial bank hence there was no business plan available but the preVIOUS
farmworker equity-sharing scheme on that farm was financed by the DLA.
4.4.1 Farmworker numbers from the surveyed farms
The farms included in the survey varied considerably with respect to the following:
the total number of farmworkers, composition of shareholders and their financial
sustainability. Two of these farms, Farm A and Farm C, were undergoing liquidation,
resulting in a lack of working vigour among farmworkers and thus affecting their
presence and availability on the farm. Farm C was undergoing a change in ownership
in that farmworkers wanted total ownership of the farm after the failure of the
previous farmworker equity-sharing scheme. Farm D was liquidated during the course
of this study but was included in this study. Therefore the responses received varied in
accordance to the situation on the farm.
Table 4.1: Respondents' representation from the case studies
*The total number of the shareholders on each farm includes committee members.
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Because of the liquidation process the number of the committee members and
shareholder workers on Farm A was less than the initial number." Farm B had
shareholder workers who are working on other farms and only 10 shareholder workers
worked on the farm included in the equity-sharing scheme. There are 19 non-
shareholders working on Farm D but all of these workers were not permanently
employed on the farm hence their availability for interviews was not easy.
4.4.2 Description of Farm A
The farm is situated in the Ceres area. In 2001, the sole owner of the farm established
a farmworker equity-sharing scheme on the farm. The initial idea was to cultivate and
pack fresh fruit such as plums, apples, pears and peaches. The fruit were exported to
the Netherlands and sold to local retail stores. Employees of two adjacent farms
purchased 1/3 of the shares in a fruit drying and packaging company. Three farms
from the area were involved on the farmworker equity-sharing scheme. This scheme
was later liquidated in year 2000.
In 2002 about 154 farmworkers received about R18 000 each to buy shares in the
farm. Shareholders later elected a board of directors. At the time of the study only
four out of 19 present beneficiaries at the time were female as the number had
declined. Working capital was received from a private banking institution. The
company started out as a private company but changed into a public company a few
months later. Farmworkers had a 100 percent share on the farm. A change in
ownership occurred after the workers of the farm in which they were shareholders
before bought shares when a previous scheme (fruit and drying company) liquidated.
However, during the visit the farm was being liquidated which meant that the second
scheme on the farm had failed.
4.4.2.1 Management
There are five managers sitting on the board of directors, elected by other
shareholders. The following portfolios existed: Finance and Administration,
Production, Dry Fruit and Production, Quality Assurance and Tunnels Manager.
19 Of the 23 members the manager could not give an indication of the exact number still available that
day.
58
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
During the visit only two managers were working. Farmworkers' shares are organised
in a trust and the management of the shares is in the hands of elected trustees.
4.4.2.2 Land use
The total farm size included in the farmworker equity-sharing scheme is 1235 ha. This
size includes two other adjacent farms included on the scheme with a non functional
fruit packing and drying facility situated on one of the farms. Of the total 100 ha is
cultivated land, 52 ha of cultivated dryland, 20 ha of farm yard and waste land and the
rest of the land is land in the other farm that was no longer used. The farm produced
pears as their main enterprise with peaches / nectarines, apricots, prunes and
tomatoes.
4.4.3 Description of Farm B
Farm B is situated in the Grabouw area. The farmworker equity-sharing scheme on
this farm was established during the time when the grant was allocated to households
instead of individual applicants. Farmworker households living and/or working on
two estates established this scheme in 1996. In essence the scheme involves the
provision of land by two parties, namely one of the estates and government, for a fruit
and wine scheme. This was done to allow beneficiaries to acquire equity as well as
security of tenure. The one estate had 71 households, of which 43.6 percent (31) were
female-headed households, while the other estate had 76 households, of which 22.4
percent (17) were female-headed households. The number of farmworkers listed as
being involved in the project as beneficiaries were 199. However, there are only 10
beneficiaries who actually work in the actual project. The project changed its initial
name after it had launched its own wine label.
Farmworker households from both estates received the RIS 000 grant from the
DLA.20 The scheme is one of the first farmworker equity-sharing schemes in South
Africa following the Whitehall farmworker equity-sharing scheme. The scheme has
matured and evolved over the past few years. Initially this was a three-way joint
20 This grant was previously known as SLAG and then modified into LRAD.
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venture between the community, the government and the estate but later the
government was playing a smaller role as 'silent partner'.
Women participated in the scheme not only as members of a household but also as
individuals in the community with certain programmes aimed at improving women's
position on the estates. Various other institutions were involved with vanous
interventions, such as developing constitutions and helping with elections.
4.4.3.1 Management
According to the business plan, skills empowerment was the scheme's central theme.
This allows high level of self-management and participative management structures
with pro-active training. Parties are involved only to provide strategic management.
Two parties playa role in the strategic management, namely representatives from one
of the estates and the community trust.
4.4.3.2 Land use
The farm area covers about 180 ha which was secured through two 3D-year leases to
the estate. This arrangement was later to be converted to the operating company.
Irrigation and soil studies were conducted on the land and the orchard design and
cultivar selection was done on the basis of advice from a deciduous fruit specialist.
4.4.4 Description of Farm C
This farm also is situated in the Grabouw area. During the visit the farm was
undergoing liquidation from a previous farmworker equity-sharing scheme.
Farmworkers bought the farm after it was liquidated and now they have total
ownership of the farm. With the help of a consultant the farmworkers applied for a
loan from a commercial bank to buy the farm. About 43 farmworkers, who were
workers on the previous farm in which they were shareholders, established this
scheme. About 35 men and eight women on the farm are shareholders. Shareholding
was open to all workers on the farm.
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4.4.4.1 Management
Farmworkers are organised in a trust and the farm is operated as a company. The trust
is responsible for running the shares of the farmworkers and the company runs the
farm, with the sole responsibility of making profits and practising all business
principles. Three managers elected by other shareholders are responsible for the
operation of the company. These managers hold the following portfolios: Finance and
Administration, Production, and Human Resources.
4.4.4.2 Land use
Of the 312 ha total farm land included in the farmworker equity-sharing scheme about
140 ha is cultivated land, 132 ha of farm yard and waste land and 40 ha is veld land.
The farm produces fruits, mostly apples, pears and peaches. However, one of the
challenges facing the farm is the age of the trees as the farmworkers bought a farm
that had been in existence for a period of time. However, the farm has a variety of
deciduous fruit trees, mostly apples.
4.4.5 Description of Farm D
The farm, situated in the Paarl district, produces organic table grapes. A total of 244
farmworkers from four farms applied for government grants from the LRAD
programme to purchase equity in four farms in the area. The fourth farm was to be
rented from a family trust which was going to be involved in the scheme as a
shareholder as these were their farmworkers. The farms are valued at approximately
R15.5 million and the equipment at approximately R2 million.
In addition to the LRAD grants farmworkers applied for a loan from a commercial
bank as their own contribution (one of the stipulated conditions of the LRAD
programme). The grants plus the loans of about R20 500 per person, with their 'sweat
equity' valued at R5 000 per person, was going to assist farmworkers to purchase the
equity. Farmworkers were the majority shareholders in the farms as their shares were
approximately 70 percent.
According to the business plan, all the applicants fitted the profile of intended
beneficiaries in terms of the LRAD programme. All the applicants are said to be
permanently employed farmworkers and will all participate actively in the operation
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of the project. A total of 171 applicants (68%) are said to be females, which means
they form the majority of shareholders. In order to ensure representation at decision-
making level, the draft trust deed provides that at least four of the nine trustees on the
farmworkers ' trust must be female.
The four farms have about 280 permanent employees with the rest of other
shareholder workers being part-time workers. The offer of equity was extended to all
permanent employees, of whom 30 declined to take up equity. There is therefore a
high level of participation in the project and no disruptive tension between
participants and non-participants.
A series of workshops were held with all beneficiaries, after which a steering
committee was elected. The legal and institutional arrangements, finances and project
structure were discussed in depth in workshops with the all the workers.
The farm is subject to the provisions of the Empowerment Equity Act and a formal
empowerment equity plan that was lodged with the Department of Labour. This
project is included as the prime empowerment vehicle in terms of the Empowerment
Equity Plan.
4.4.5. J Management
The workers' trust holds 70 percent of the company shares and the company is a duly
incorporated private company in terms of the Companies Act. Beneficiaries may trade
their participation units among each other but they may not ask the trust to liquidate
their investment (e.g. sell their shares on their behalf) for a period of five years.
Should the shareholders in the trust wish to sell their shares they have to offer them to
the trust or the company first. For the first three years, neither shareholder may sell
their shares to either the company or outsiders. This is envisaged to ensure the
stability of the project and allow training programmes, which emphasise long-term
investment strategies to be internalised. Voting rights are commensurate with
shareholding but a number of decisions require consensus.
4.4.5.2 Land use
The farmworker equity-sharing scheme on farm is made up of farmworkers from four
adjacent farms. The only information available about the land use on the farm was
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that the main farm from which the farmworker equity-sharing scheme was produced
organic table grapes.
Housing on the farms IS scarce and most workers have their own off-farm
accommodation but are provided with free daily transport to the farms. There is
therefore no security of tenure issues. The farm to be leased to the company will
include vines, an office complex, packhouse and cold storage facilities. The amount is
equal to the finance repayment for the cold storage facilities. Many of the table grapes
cultivars are young.
4.4.6 Description of Farm E
Farm E is situated in Ceres, where farmworkers have a share in a company that owns
a controlled atmosphere cold storage facility. Farmworkers from eight farms under the
estate management are included on this farmworker equity-sharing scheme. About
932 farmworkers applied for the LRAD grants to invest in this facility. Female
representation among the beneficiaries is 53 percent and retired persons five percent.
The fact that the enterprise holds low risk, substantial shareholding, visibility,
profitability, simplicity and is demand driven motivated the decision to invest in a
cold storage facility. This decision was reached after a number of internal
consultations. Because this was a different farmworker equity-sharing scheme for the
DLA, certain clauses were imposed to qualify the application for grants.
4.4.6.1 Management
Shareholders are responsible for electing the directors of the company, namely the
worker's trust and the management group. A specialised appointed manager is
responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility while the management
group is contracted to render support services such as financial, personnel and other
administrative functions. This was done to minimise costs. The company owns the
land and the facility. The worker's trust (with 11 trustees)" handles the worker's
investments. According to the business plan, no shareholders are entitled to sell their
shares for a period of five years.
21 The largest estates have two trustees each (one must be female), while smaller estates have one
trustee each (with no gender specifications).
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Only the trust may 'buyout' one of the beneficiaries and no tradability to each other
or to the outsiders is allowed in order to avoid a proliferation of beneficiaries. To have
funds that allow exit, trustees are can uphold up to two thirds of income to be placed
into a reserve fund. For security of tenure, beneficiaries are not allowed to withdraw
(or liquidate) their investments in cash; the trust should rather buy land or housing for
the employees. Future estate workers may apply to become beneficiaries after they
have worked for two years.
4.4.6.2 Farm land / Facility use
As one of the stipulations of the requirements by the DLA, at least 50 percent of the
fruit stored had to be produced on one of the estates and the land on which the facility
was to be constructed had to be zoned as agricultural.
4.5 Chapter summary
The chapter described the parameters under which the study would be performed, the
instruments to be used thereof and the analysis of data. Some of the challenges faced
during data collection hindered the availability and the use of the described analysis
instruments. An overview of the area under which the schemes operated and an
overview of the farms introduced the reader to the evaluation and analysis of the
farms. The evaluation and analysis of the data collected is dealt with in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FARMS
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results of the survey for each case study.
In this chapter a descriptive summary of the farms, and aspects of institutional
arrangement and governance of the farms, the motivation behind the establishment of
the equity-sharing schemes and socio-economic aspects will be discussed.
5.2 Evaluation of Farm A
5.2.1 Descriptive summary of the Farm A
During the visit the farm had just been liquidated from the first farmworker equity-
sharing scheme which had been the previous farm owner. Farmworkers took total
control of the farm and contracted a consultant to assist them in running the farm. The
farm was visited in order to obtain the perceptions of all the role players regarding the
scheme.
The Finance and Administration Manager, who was once a farmworker, was the
interviewed manager. According to the manager, there were formal negotiations with
worker representatives during the initiation of the farmworker equity-sharing scheme
on the farm on 8 September 2001. Shareholders can trade off their shares after five
years. However, the company has first option to buy, followed by other shareholders,
and then outside buyers.
Number of years and permanency of work qualified workers to be shareholders. There
were no workers who did not want to buy shares. Since the establishment of the
scheme on the farm only one worker was retrenched during the 2001/2002 period and
about eight permanent farmworkers resigned in the 2002/2003 period. The farm
produces apples and pears.
5.2.2 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
Farmworkers have a 100 percent share in the farm. The scheme included all the land,
fixed and moveable assets on the farm and was organised as a company. The scheme
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was financed solely through the land grant. There were four farmworkers on the board
of directors, holding the following portfolios: Finance and Administration Manager,
Production Manager, Dry Fruit Production Manager and Quality Assurance Manager.
All the respondents answered that they were not allowed to join any union.
5.2.2.1 Relations of power
According to the manager, workers elected worker representatives. Only 38 percent of
the shareholder workers were satisfied with the representatives; the other 62 percent
were not. The main reason given for this non-satisfaction was the lack of consultation
and feedback from the representatives. Other reasons were unfulfilled promises and
the fact that representatives did not have power but the consultant did. One respondent
said there was a lot of confusion amongst the leaders. Weekly meetings between
committee members and other shareholder workers were held to examine workers'
feelings about the scheme and how the scheme was managed.
5.2.2.2 Beneficiaries' influence on decision making
All Committee members agreed that they influenced working conditions, health issues
and housing issues on the farm. While only 50 percent of them felt that they
influenced wages and strategic planning on the farm. However, all of them agreed that
they don't influence other issues on the farm. Shareholder workers on the other hand
felt that they don't influence most of the decisions on the farm as more than 50
percent of them indicated that they don't influence the day-to-day operations, wages,
working conditions, employment issues and health issues on the farm.
This shows that between the committee members and the shareholder workers their
influence in decision making is minimal as all the interviewed committee members
felt that they don't influence decisions such as the day-to-day operations of the farm.
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Decisions influenced
Categories
I- Comrittee Yes _ Shareholder workers Yes I
* These are the questions which were not asked to shareholder workers
Figure 5.1: Decisions influenced on Farm A
The manager highlighted that farmworkers influenced the operations of the farm in all
aspects. Less than 40 percent shareholder workers indicated that they influenced most
of the decisions on the farm. Both non-shareholder workers felt that they influenced
all the decisions.
5.2.3 The establishment of the scheme
All committee members and the shareholder workers agreed that the establishment of
the scheme was the manager's idea. However, the manager felt that this was the
farmworkers' idea. All committee members and shareholder workers agreed that
management communicated the establishment of the scheme to them. All respondents
signed contracts to work on the farm.
5.2.3.1 Motivationfor the establishment of the scheme
The manager and committee members provided many reasons as motivation for
establishing the scheme, as illustrated in Table 5.1. The manager alluded to the fact
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that another motivation for establishing the scheme was to prove that empowerment
could be achieved through farmworker equity-sharing schemes.
Table 5.1: Motivation for establishment of the scheme on Farm A
Manager Committee Shareholder
n=1 n=2 workers
n=8
Reasons Yes Yes Yes
Improve productivity 1 2 7
Improve workers' income 1 2 6
Improve workers' wealth 1 2 6
Improve job security 1 2 7
Improve relations 1 2 7
Improve worker loyalty 1 2 7
Empower workers 1 2 7
Only the shareholder workers differed as to the establishment of the scheme on the
farm. The interviewed non-shareholders believed that the motivation was to improve
security of employment, loyalty and empowerment. Only one indicated that another
motivation was to improve productivity on the farm. To improve relations on the farm
was chosen as the most important reason for the establishment of the farmworker
equity scheme on the farm. The reason for this could be either that they were not
briefed or included in the establishment process or the reasons were not properly
communicated to them.
5.2.3.2 Role players' motivation for joining the scheme
The reasons most respondents choose for joining the scheme are illustrated in Table
5.2. It is clear that concern about security of employment was more important to
shareholder workers than skills transfer. The manager and the committee members
agreed that these motivations applied equally to them.
Table 5.2: Respondents motivation for joining the scheme on Farm A
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=2 n=8
Motivation to join Yes Yes Yes
Security of employment 1 2 8
Increase in income 1 2 7
Increase in wealth 1 2 7
Retirement saving 1 2 7
Skills transfer 1 2 6
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Sixty percent of the respondents on the farm had participated in an equity-sharing
scheme before, although only half of the interviewed shareholder workers had never
participated in an equity-sharing scheme before. The latter could have been employed
after the liquidation of the previous scheme on the farm. However, despite the
liquidation process, almost all the role players on the farm felt that they had made the
right decision by joining the farmworker equity-sharing scheme. The non-shareholder
workers pointed out that they would have loved to join the farmworker equity-sharing
scheme on the farm but could not, as it was liquidating.
5.2.3.3 Workers' expectations of the scheme
About 50 percent of the committee members and the shareholder workers indicated
that they had expectations from the scheme, and that management was aware of their
expectations. Another 50 percent of the shareholder workers indicated that
management was not aware of their expectations, as they did not communicate them
to management. Those who had expectations believed that they will fulfil them while
on the other hand half of them did not think so. Those who indicated that they felt it
was not the right decision to join the scheme said that they expected a better future
and that so far they never achieved anything from the scheme as it was being
liquidated. Both non-shareholder workers did not have any expectations of the
farmworker equity-sharing scheme on the farm.
5.2.3.4 Role players' benefit from the scheme
Only 25 percent of shareholder workers were aware of benefits for themselves, for the
former farm owner and for other shareholder farmworkers. Committee members
indicated that they weren't aware of any benefits for the former farm owner or other
shareholder workers. Only one non-shareholder worker was aware of benefits for all
beneficiaries (but not for himself). The other did not know of any benefits for all
beneficiaries. Only one committee member knew of benefits for him. The manager
was aware of benefits for himself and the shareholder workers but not for the former
farm owner. Respondents intended to remain as shareholders on the farm for five
years on average (minimum one year and maximum 10 years).
69
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.2.4 Socio-economic aspects
This section presents findings on the responses received regarding social and
economic aspects of the farm. Workers provided their perceptions of the changes that
have occurred on the farm which were meant to improve their livelihoods and
increase their attachment to the farm.
5.2.4.1 Changes on the/arm
Respondents were asked if the changes regarding various aspects were better, worse
or if there were no changes at all. These results are presented in Table 5.3. The
manager felt that all the aspects had changed for the better whereas the committee
members felt that most aspects had changed for the worse or there was no change at
all. However, they unanimously agreed on the changes in the following: food security
(no change), authoritative power (no change), trust (worse), skills (better) and gender
(no change).
Table 5.3: Shareholder workers' response to changes on Farm A (n=8)
Don't Better Worse No changeknow
Health issues 1 2 1 4
Education 1 0 1 6
Housing 1 1 1 5
Working conditions 0 3 1 4
Food security 1 2 0 5
Authoritative power 1 0 1 6
Security of employment 0 0 4 4
Trust 0 0 3 5
Skills transfer 1 4 0 3
Gender treatment 0 2 0 6
Relations 0 0 0 0
Shareholder workers' responses seemed to differ significantly on the various aspects.
Most of the respondents felt that there were no changes in most of the aspects. Only a
few indicated that there were changes for the better. Nevertheless most respondents
agreed that there was a positive change in their skills since the implementation of the
scheme. As expected, the liquidation process threatened workers' security of
employment, as 50 percent of them felt that there was either no change or a negative
change. One non-shareholder worker did not know of any changes while another
alleged that no changes have occurred in all aspects.
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5.2.4.2 Training and skills transfer
The manager answered that all the workers received formal" training. The
interviewed committee members replied that they received no training. Figure 5.2
illustrates the responses received from the shareholder workers.
Training
100%
90%
80%
70%
ID 60%CD
J!Ic 50%Cl)..,... 40%Cl)
Il.
30%
20%
10%
0%
Did~u receil.e Financial
training
Mlnagerial OIher Informal Formaltraining ll\ás the
training training
sufficient
Type of training
o Shareholder WOI1<ersNot applica~IIShareholder workers Yes • Shareholder workers No
Figure 5.2: Farmworker shareholders' responses regarding training received on
Farm A
Fifty percent of those who had received training did so in managerial aspects.
However, these shareholder workers had received different training as can be seen
from the above figure. In general these respondents had received both formal and
informal training. About 25 percent had received financial training. More than 35
percent answered that the training they had received was informal. They all agreed
that there had been no other training. Fifty percent of those who received training felt
that it was inadequate. The scheme used training institutions close to them for training
their workers.
22 Formal training refers to training received or administered by an agent or training institution and not
by any member of the farm staff. All respondents were made aware of this classification.
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5.2.4.3 Wages and dividends
Regarding workers' income, there were no major differences in the responses. Most
of the respondents stated that they received a weekly income. A few received a
monthly income. Only the manager said that the workers received yearly bonuses,
while the rest of the respondents did not agree. There were no performance bonuses
and the scheme paid dividends in 2002 which were paid out in cash. According to the
manager, the dividends were reinvested in the farm but the committee and shareholder
workers disagreed.
5.2.4.4 Absenteeism
Due to inadequate record keeping it was difficult for the manager to answer on
absenteeism on the farm since the establishment of the scheme. He speculated that
there were few absentees and that workers looked more productive than before, which
was also confirmed by the committee members.
5.2.4.5 Gender relations
All respondents agreed that there were no difference in the treatment of women and
men doing the same work on the farm. Also there were no differences in wages.
5.2.4.6 Education offarmworkers' children
Respondents were asked if their school-aged children were attending school. The
majority's children attended school on the farm while a few attended school in town.
Free transport was provided for the children.
5.2.4.7 Housing situation on thefarm
All the interviewed respondents as well as the manager indicated that they lived on
the farm. Housing is part of a package in terms of which they stay in the house as long
as they are working on the farm. The houses ranged from having two rooms to having
seven rooms. All but one respondent agreed that the houses had electricity, sanitation
and tap water, for which they did not pay.
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All the respondents lived with their spouses and/or children. Only one did not live
with a partner but with a child. The number of children ranged between one and three,
with the average being two. No respondents were staying with their parents. The
manager stated that no new houses had been built on the farm since the
implementation of the scheme.
5.2.4.8 Worker relations on the/arm
When asked about the relations on the farm, 100 percent of the committee members
responded that their direct manager was approachable and that communication
between them was good. About 75 percent of the shareholder workers felt that their
direct manager was approachable while 25 percent felt that he was not. Both the
committee members and the shareholder workers felt that they were given clear
instructions for work to be done.
5.2.4.9 Health issues on the/arm
A health service is provided by the Department of Health by means of a mobile clinic
which visits the farm once a month.
5.2.5 Other aspects of the farm
Specific working conditions: Only one shareholder worker did work that was
detrimental to his health. The worker received protective gear to cover himself when
working. Thirty eight percent of the shareholders indicated that there were no
restrooms in the fields where they worked.
Comments:
Negative - All the respondents had negative comments about the scheme with only
one shareholder worker and one committee worker who did not have positive
comments. All concerned parties indicated that there was no communication between
management (including the contracted consultant) and the workers and that the
consultant used the profits to buy a neighbouring farm without consulting the
shareholders. The manager added that despite the fact that he was a financial and
administration manager he was not allowed to use or see the farm statements.
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Positive - The farmworkers felt privileged to be given a chance to run the farm on
their own and believe that they can make a difference and make the equity-sharing
scheme work. All the respondents highlighted that they felt more skilled than before.
5.3 Evaluation of Farm B
5.3.1 Descriptive summary of the farm
Farmworkers have a 42 percent share in the farm, while the other shares are held by
other parties. The manager indicated that there had been formal negotiations between
the former farm owner and the farmworkers on the farm before initiating the scheme.
She further stressed that farmworkers had been represented in those negotiations. The
scheme was started in 1996 with finance from the farm owner's capital, farmworkers '
capital, a commercial bank and another financier. During the initiation no
farmworkers refused to buy shares on the farm. These shares are tradable under the
condition that first option is given to other shareholders and shareholders cannot leave
before a five-year period. If a shareholder wants to leave before five years s/he first
has to get a house (to ensure that workers have housing security). Shareholders had to
have a number of service years, be a certain age and have work permanency to qualify
as a shareholder. There were 147 shareholders in the scheme but most of these
shareholders were not working on the farm that was part of the farmworker equity-
sharing scheme. Only two permanent farmworkers were retrenched in the 200012001
period and none after that.
5.3.2 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
The former farm owner, who operates a neighbouring farm in the area, holds 18
percent of the shares, farmworkers 42 percent and a third party shareholder 40
percent. The farmworkers' shares are organised in a trust. All the parties involved on
the farmworker equity-share scheme on the farm are represented on the board of
trustees. Farmworkers are represented by four farmworkers on the board of trustees
on the farm.
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5.3.2.1 Relations of power
Worker representatives (two male and one female) take issues ansmg from
farmworkers to management. These representatives are chosen by other farmworkers.
Only one shareholder worker was not satisfied with the representatives because they
don't report back. All shareholder workers indicated that they make suggestions to
management. Only two of them felt that their suggestions are accepted. Again only
one shareholder worker felt that management does not respond to their suggestions.
Representatives said that they meet every month in order to discuss opinions from
other workers. The meetings include discussion on how the farm should be managed.
All respondents indicated that they were not allowed to join any union.
5.3.2.2 Beneficiaries' influence on decision making
Figure 5.3 indicates that committee members felt that they influenced most of the
general decisions that shareholder workers influenced on the farm. However, their
opinions differ. One committee member was uncertain if they could influence those
decisions. The manager, however, stated that workers influenced the following
decisions: day-to-day operation of the farm, wages, working conditions on the farm,
health issues and housing issues.
Decisions influenced
100%
=
80%
c 60%
0a.
~
40%
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Categories
ra-Comrittee Yes. Shareholderworkers Yes I
* These are the questions which were not asked to shareholder workers
Figure 5.3: Influence on decision making on Farm B
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5.3.3 The establishment of the scheme
All respondents indicated that the idea to start an equity-sharing scheme on the farm
was the manager's. All the respondents said that the manager communicated the idea
to them. Respondents indicated that they signed a contract to work on the farm.
5.3.3.1 Motivation for the establishment of the scheme
The manager, committee members and the shareholder workers agreed unanimously
about the motivation for the establishment of the scheme on this farm (see Table 5.4).
Committee members and shareholder workers were of the opinion that improving
workers' income and wealth and empowering workers were the most important
reasons for establishing the scheme. The manager indicated that property ownership
was the most important motivation for establishing the scheme.
Table 5.4: Motivation for establishment of the scheme on Farm B
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=2 n=4
Reasons Yes Yes Yes
Improve productivity 1 2 4
Improve workers' income 1 2 4
Improve workers' wealth 1 2 4
Improve job security 1 2 4
Improve relations 1 2 4
Improve worker loyalty 1 2 4
Empower workers 1 2 4
5.3.3.2 Role players' motivation for joining the scheme
None of the respondents disagreed with the options given. All the reasons indicated in
Table 5.5 motivated the respondents to join this equity-sharing scheme.
Table 5.5: Respondents' motivation for joining the scheme on Farm B
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=2 n=4
Motivation to join Yes Yes Yes
Security of employment 1 2 4
Increase in income 1 2 4
Increase in wealth 1 2 4
Retirement saving 1 2 4
Skills transfer 1 2 4
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The committee as well as shareholder workers had prior experience with equity-
sharing schemes as all indicated that they had participated in an equity-sharing
scheme before. They all believe that they made the right decision to join the scheme
on this farm. Respondents were enthusiastic about the scheme and they felt it was an
honour or an advantage to be part of the scheme. Some indicated that there was
progress in the scheme as they received better positions and benefits such as medical
benefits, which never existed before.
5.3.3.3 Workers' expectations of the scheme
The respondents had expectations of the scheme and all indicated that management
was aware of their expectations. Committee members, shareholder workers and the
manager believed that their expectations would be fulfilled. Their belief stemmed
from the fact that they felt they were part of a successful business and they felt that
their children had a better future.
5.3.3.4 Role players' benefit from the scheme
Only one shareholder worker did not know of any benefits for himself, while two
shareholder workers did not know of any benefits for the former owner. Three of the
four shareholder workers knew of benefits for other shareholder workers. On the other
hand, committee members felt that there was no former farm owner; hence there
couldn't be any benefits for him. Neither knew of any benefits for themselves.
5.3.4 Socio-economic aspects
5.3.4.1 Changes on the farm
Table 5.6 indicates that for most of the issues shareholder workers were uncertain or
felt that changes were for the better. Only on a few issues did one shareholder worker
feel that there were no changes. Interestingly no shareholder worker felt that there was
a change for the worse in any of the issues. Both committee members felt that they
did not know of any changes on the farm since the implementation of the scheme. The
manager identified several issues that did not change on the farm since the
implementation of the scheme. These were issues regarding health, education,
77
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
housing and trust. From the manager's point of view all other issues changed for the
better.
Table 5.6: Shareholder workers' response to changes on Farm B (n=4)
Don't Better Worse No changeknow
Health issues 2 2 0 0
Education 2 2 0 0
Housing 2 1 0 1
Working conditions 2 2 0 0
Food security 2 2 0 0
Authoritative power 2 1 0 1
Security of employment 2 2 0 0
Trust 2 1 0 1
Skills transfer 2 2 0 0
Gender treatment 2 0 0 2
Relations 2 2 0 0
5.3.4.2 Training and skills transfer
Only one of the interviewed committee members had received training. This training
was on financial aspects and not on other managerial aspects. However, the
respondent believes that this formal training was enough for her to understand the
operations of the scheme. Only one shareholder worker received informal training on
financial and other managerial aspects. The respondent felt that the training was
sufficient to understand the operations of the scheme. The other shareholder workers
interviewed had not received any training at all. However, the manager stated that all
respondents had received formal training on the managerial aspects of the scheme and
that the training was sufficient for the shareholders to understand the operations of the
scheme.
5.3.4.3 Wages and dividends
According to the committee members and the shareholder workers, workers received
monthly wages with yearly bonuses but no performance bonuses or any other
benefits. However, the manager highlighted that workers received weekly wages
(This could have been the case with other workers that were not interviewed). The
farm has not yet paid any dividends. The reason provided by the manager was that
they were waiting to see what will happen with the profits but were ready to pay in a
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week's time. Respondents did not know why the dividends had not been paid. Some
felt that there was a need to let the business grow first and payoff the debt.
5.3.4.4 Absenteeism
Absenteeism has been constant between 2001 and 2003. Twelve farmworkers and one
foreman have been recorded absent during this period. Committee members believed
that farmworkers were more productive now than before the implementation of the
scheme.
5.3.4.5 Gender relations
There was no different treatment with respect to gender on the farm. No difference in
wages for male and female workers doing the same kind of work was experienced.
5.3.4.6 Education of farmworkers )children
Only two shareholder workers had children attending school. Both committee
members had school-aged children attending school. Most of the children attended
school in town; one committee member had a child attending school on the farm. The
latter indicated that the school was nearby so no transport to school was provided.
Only one respondent indicated that the child attending school in town was provided
with free transport.
5.3.4.7 Housing situation on the farm
All the respondents as well as the manager lived on the farm. The biggest house had
nine rooms and the smallest had five rooms; on average the houses had six rooms.
Respondents seemed to live in these houses on different terms. All committee
members and most shareholder workers indicated that these houses have been leased
to them, while only one shareholder worker indicated that it was a farmhouse (i.e.
community house). According to the manager, his house was part of the
remuneration. All the houses had electricity, sanitation and tap water. Respondents
only paid for electricity and not for sanitation and tap water.
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Only one shareholder worker did not live with someone. Other respondents lived with
spouses, parents and children. On average the family size comprised of two people
per house.
5.3.4.8 Worker relations on thefarm
There was consensus amongst the shareholders about the approachability of their
direct managers. Committee members were divided about how approachable their
direct managers were. However, all respondents felt that they were given clear
instructions for their work.
5.3.4.9 Health issues on thefarm
Health services were provided on the farm as a nurse visited the farm once a month.
5.3.5 Other aspects of the farm
Specific working conditions:
According to the manager, workers were not doing any work that was detrimental to
their health. According to the shareholder workers, however, one did work
detrimental to his health but protective gear was provided. Neither of the committee
members do any work detrimental to their health. All respondents indicated that there
were restrooms in the fields where they work.
Comments:
Negative - It is a cause for concern that the majority of shareholder workers felt that
there was poor communication and feedback on the progress of the farm. Committee
members shared these feelings, and they were supposed to be involved in decision
making on the farm. Another shared negative comment was the absence of training
for the workers in order to assist them to understand how the scheme works.
Shareholder workers felt that their opinions did not reach the directors. These
comments indicated poor communication between the workers and management.
Positive - Most of the respondents had further positive comments about the scheme.
Those who had, mentioned that they felt the farm was successful and that there had
been several improvements. Some improvements were that respondents received
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feedback on the progress of the farm, they were part of decision making and there had
been improvement regarding housing issues.
5.4 Evaluation of Farm C
5.4.1 Descriptive summary of the farm
Situated in the Grabouw area, the farm has about 43 farmworkers (35 male and 8
female) who bought 100 percent share in a farm that had been liquidated in 2002.
They hired a consultant to assist in the implementation and operation of the scheme.
According to the manager, no formal negotiations were entered into, as there were
only farmworkers to negotiate. Farmworkers received a 100 percent loan from a
commercial bank to buy the farm. The shares are not tradable but shareholders are
allowed to exit the scheme when they wish to do so. No farmworker refused to buy
shares in the farm. Permanency of work was used as criteria to qualify as a
shareholder. The farm still has the same number of workers since the establishment of
the initial farmworker equity-sharing scheme, there are three foremen and four
managers on the present scheme.
5.4.2 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
The farm is totally owned by farmworkers and consists of all the land, fixed and
moveable assets on the farm. The workers' shares are organised in a trust. Three
worker elected representatives sit on the board of directors as Finance and
Administration, Production and Human Resource Managers. One committee member
indicated that meetings were held once in a month, while the others indicated that
meetings were held weekly to discuss the day-to-day operation of the farm, income
and future benefits to the workers.
5.4.2.1 Relations of power
Farmworkers had worker representatives (6 male and 1 female) on the farm. While
the majority of the shareholder workers were satisfied with these representatives, one
shareholder worker wasn't, complaining that they can't solve workers' problems and
keep referring workers to other representatives. Worker representatives believed that
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workers worked harder now than before the present scheme and that these workers
were more productive.
Worker representatives indicated that suggestions they make are accepted by
management and that they receive feedback. Fifty seven percent of shareholder
workers indicated that they made suggestions on the farm and that management
responded to them. This attests to the level of participation.
5.4.2.2 Beneficiaries' influence on decision making
Worker representatives from this farm felt that they played a role in decision making
on the farm. All the interviewed representatives and shareholder workers believed that
they influenced major decisions, such as the day-to-day operations of the farm,
working conditions and employment issues. Few shareholder workers felt that they
did not influence decision on wages and health issues. Worker representatives were
involved in financial, strategic, technical and housing issues on the farm, as can be
seen from Figure 5.4.
Dec~ionsinfluenced
~e
o
Co
~
Categories
I- Comrittee Yes_ Shareholder workers Yes I
* These are the questions which were not asked to shareholder workers
Figure 5.4: Influence on decision making on Farm C
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5.4.3 The establishment of the scheme
The idea to establish an equity-sharing scheme on the farm appears to have been the
farmworkers' idea, as indicated by 71 percent of the shareholder workers and the
manager. However, one committee member and another shareholder member believed
that the idea was a government representative's, and one shareholder worker thought
that it was the former owner's idea. Shareholder workers seemed to vary in their
opinion as to who communicated the idea to them. About 67 percent of the committee
and shareholder workers said it was management, while 29 percent of shareholder
workers and 33 percent of committee members believed that it was a consultant.
Twenty eight percent of shareholder workers indicated that it was other farmworkers
and the same percentage believed that it was the former farm owner. Forty three
percent of shareholder workers indicated that they did not sign a contract to work on
the farm.
5.4.3.1 Motivationfor the establishment of the scheme
Respondents felt that most of the reasons given were motivations for establishing the
equity-sharing scheme on the farm. Only one shareholder worker felt that improving
job security was not one of the motivations. The manager added that the scheme
presented an opportunity to establish and grow "self-worth and improve social and
economic empowerment".
Table 5.7: Motivation for establishment of the scheme on Farm C
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=3 n=7
Reasons Yes Yes Yes
Improve productivity 1 3 7
Improve workers' income 1 3 7
Improve workers' wealth 1 3 7
Improve job security 1 2 6
Improve relations 1 3 7
Improve worker loyalty 1 3 7
Empower workers 1 3 7
5.4.3.2 Role players' motivation for joining the scheme
One shareholder worker indicated that he was forced to Jom the scheme as
management did not want to let him leave. He further stated that it was explained to
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him that it would be to his advantage to join the scheme. All other respondents feit
that the reasons listed in Table 5.8 motivated them to join the scheme. In contrast to
this, the manager disagreed with most of the reasons, adding that the scheme provided
an opportunity to be part of "something special".
Table 5.8: Respondents' motivation for joining the scheme on Farm C
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 N=3 n=7
Motivation to join Yes Yes Yes
Security of employment 1 2 6
Increase in income 0 3 6
Increase in wealth 0 3 6
Retirement saving 0 3 6
Skills transfer 0 3 6
All the respondents were previously shareholders in equity-sharing schemes except
for one committee member and two shareholder workers. Apart from one shareholder
worker, all the respondents were happy to be part of this equity-sharing scheme.
5.4.3.3 Workers' expectations of the scheme
All committee members and shareholder workers had expectations of the scheme and
all but one shareholder member indicated that the manager was aware of those
expectations. When asked if they thought their expectations would be fulfilled, only
one shareholder worker did not believe so. The manager answered 'yes' and 'no' to
the question on the fulfilment of expectations, indicating that many of the objectives
are long-term objectives that still need to be achieved. Respondents' expectations
included that the scheme will be a success, a better future for their children and
retirement savings.
5.4.3.4 Role players' benefit from the scheme
Committee members knew of the benefits for themselves, but did not know of the
benefits for other shareholder workers. The majority of shareholder workers knew of
benefits for themselves and other shareholder workers. The 'forced' shareholder
worker indicated that he did not know of any benefits for anyone in the scheme. Since
there was no former farm owner, no benefits for him were known.
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5.4.4 Socio-economic aspects
5.4.4.1 Changes on the farm
There was a high level of enthusiasm among respondents as almost all of them
indicated that all the aspects changed for the better. However, some shareholder
workers did not share the same view about changes regarding authoritative power and
gender treatment. The respondents indicated that there were no changes with respect
to these aspects. All respondents agreed that no aspects have changed negatively.
Table 5.9: Respondents response to changes on Farm C (n=l1)
Don't Better Worse No changeknow
Health issues 0 11 0 0
Education 0 11 0 0
Housing 0 11 0 0
Working conditions 0 11 0 0
Food securi ty 0 11 0 0
Authoritative power 0 10 0 1
Security of employment 0 11 0 0
Trust 0 11 0 0
Skills transfer 0 11 0 0
Gender treatment 0 8 0 3
Relations 0 11 0 0
5.4.4.2 Training and skills transfer
It was agreed by all respondents on the farm that they had received training. The
training was on both financial and managerial aspects. All respondents indicated that
the training was formal, except for one shareholder worker who thought that the
training was informal. The manager indicated that workers received both informal and
formal training, so the single respondent could have received informal training with
other shareholder workers who were not interviewed. Furthermore, this respondent
commented that the training was not sufficient, although the manager, committee
members and other shareholder workers believed otherwise.
5.4.4.3 Wages and dividends
Two committee members indicated that they received weekly remuneration, while
one member indicated monthly remuneration. All of them point out that they receive
yearly bonuses and performance bonuses. All shareholder workers, of whom 86
percent indicated that they have been receiving yearly bonuses, received monthly
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remuneration. Forty three percent of shareholder workers said that they received
performance bonuses. All respondents indicated that they received cash dividends in
2003. The manager agreed that the scheme has paid out cash dividends in 2003.
5.4.4.4 Absenteeism
Since the implementation of this equity-sharing scheme no absenteeism has been
recorded.
5.4.4.5 Gender relations
Gender did not cause problems as there was no difference in the treatment of male
and females doing the same work, including wages paid.
5.4.4.6 Education of farmworkers ' children
Committee members and shareholder workers had their school-aged children
attending school. About 23 percent of the shareholder workers and all committee
members had their children attending school in town. Apparently some of the
interviewed shareholder workers were not from the area as their children attended
school in their hometowns. Forty three percent of these shareholder workers had their
children attending school on the farm. Some of the children attending school in town
had transport provided for them while others indicated that transport was not
provided. Those who had transport did not pay for the transport.
5.4.4.7 Housing situation on the farm
Not all the respondents lived on the farm. On average those who lived on the farm had
four-room houses. The size of the houses ranged from one to six rooms. Three
respondents indicated that the houses were leased to them. Two respondents believed
that they owned the houses. All the houses had electricity, sanitation and tap water,
for which workers did not pay. The manager received his house as part of the working
agreement. No new houses have been built on the farm. There are 19 households and
29 permanent farmworkers living on the farm.
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All respondents shared their houses with other family members. Only one committee
member and one shareholder worker did not live with their spouses. On average the
families had two children per household. No respondents were living with their
parents.
5.4.4.8 Worker relations on the farm
Of all the respondents, only one committee member felt that his direct manager was
not approachable. All respondents reported that they received clear instructions for
work. Almost everyone was satisfied with the communication between workers and
their direct manager; only one committee member expressed dissatisfaction in this
regard.
5.4.4.9 Health issues on the farm
The farm ran a clinic situated on the farm. The clinic had a social worker that was
responsible for counselling workers. The clinic was not used only to care for ailments
but also to monitor any problems possibly resulting from the workers' living or social
conditions. From the clinic records and assistance of a social worker from the clinic, it
was found that most workers had financial challenges, which resulted in most
respondents suffering from headaches. Management tried to address the problem by
increasing workers' income which resulted to a decrease in headache cases reported to
the clinic consequence increase in workers production time.
5.4.5 Other aspects of the farm
Specific working conditions:
Those workers who did work detrimental to their health, such as working on the field
with poisonous substances, received protective gear.
Comments:
Negative - Some respondents complained that they need more money to go to a
private doctor while this was subsidised in the previous scheme. Others felt that their
opinions were not asked and that they didn't influence decisions on the farm.
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Positive - Respondents emphasised that they have security and a better future for
their children. Individual respondents felt that communication was good, new benefits
could be seen, better housing was available and they had more trust in management.
5.5 Evaluation of Farm D
5.5.1 Descriptive summary of the farm
The farmworker equity-sharing scheme on this Paarl farm was initiated by
management body of the farm and a consultant in 2002, with 244 farmworkers
working on four farms belonging to management body of the farm. According to the
manager (previous sole farm owner), there were formal negotiations during the
establishment of the scheme at which farmworkers were represented. The shares were
bought using land grants (30%) and commercial bank funds (70%). The scheme
operates as a company for which the trust holds all shares. Anyone who wants to sell
his/her shares should first approach the workers' trust and then the family trust. No
outsiders are allowed to buy shares. Number of years working on the farm was the
only criteria for qualification to buy shares. During the initiation there were
farmworkers who did not want to buy shares on the farm. Those workers were still not
interested in buying shares on the farm at the time of the visit. There are four
farmworker representatives on the board of directors and two representatives of the
former farm owner's family trust.
5.5.2 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
Two parties hold shares in the farm, namely the former farm owner (a third of the
shares) and the farmworkers (two thirds of the shares). Farmworkers' shares are
organised in a workers' trust.
5.5.2.1 Relations of power
Worker representatives are elected by other farmworkers, even though one committee
member said that management elected them. All shareholder workers acknowledged
that they had worker representatives on the farm and said that they were satisfied with
these representatives. However, no shareholder workers have ever made any
suggestions, while all the committee members agreed to do so. Half of the committee
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members indicated that their suggestions were acknowledged and that management
responded to their suggestions; the other half disagreed.
According to three committee members, meetings are held once every month to
discuss the following: the success of the farm and equity-sharing schemes, motivating
the workers, protecting the interests of shareholders, and bargaining for more power
from the former farm owner. One committee member indicated that meetings are not
regularly held.
5.5.2.2 Beneficiaries' influence on decision making
As depicted in Figure 5.10, there seems to be less influence on decision making by
committee and shareholder workers on the farm. The manager indicated that
farmworkers, through their directors, have an input in decision making regarding all
aspects, including housing issues, but farmworkers did not feel that way. Shareholder
workers did not feel like they played a role in most decision making. Committee
members felt that they only influenced financial aspects.
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Figure 5.5: Workers' influence on decision making on Farm D
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5.5.3 The establishment ofthe scheme
The present manager thought that the idea to start a farmworker equity-sharing
scheme on the farm was the farm management committee and a consultant's idea.
About 56 percent of the shareholder workers thought it was the former farm owner's
idea, about 33 percent believed that it was a consultant's idea, while only one
shareholder worker indicated that she did not know. All workers signed contracts to
work on the farm.
5.5.3.1 Motivationfor the establishment of the scheme
The manager indicated that all the stated reasons motivated the establishment of the
equity-sharing scheme on the farm. There were, however, many differences between
the committee members and the shareholder workers. All committee members
believed that improving workers' income was the main motivation, while shareholder
workers felt that improving workers' income, improving workers' wealth and
improving job security were the most applicable motivations. One shareholder worker
said that she did not know the motivation behind the establishment of the scheme,
although she has been on the farm for ten years. Most respondents felt that the main
motivation was to improve workers' wealth.
Table 5.10: Motivation for establishment of the scheme on Farm D
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=4 n=9
Reasons Yes Yes Yes
Improve productivity 1 2 3
Improve workers' income 1 4 6
Improve workers' wealth 1 2 6
Iml'rovejob security 1 2 6
Improve relations 1 2 2
Improve worker loyalty 1 2 3
Empower workers 1 2 3
Create a sustainable income
generating business 1 0 0
5.5.3.2 Role players' motivation for joining the scheme
Most shareholder workers choose an increase in income followed by an increase in
wealth as motivation for joining the scheme. Committee members added security of
employment to these. The manager felt that retirement saving and skills transfer were
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not motivations for joining the scheme. He added other motivations such as creating a
sustainable income generating business.
Table 5.11: Respondents' motivation for joining the scheme on Farm D
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=4 n=9
Motivation to join Yes Yes Yes
Security of employment 1 4 4
Increase in income 1 4 8
Increase in wealth 1 4 6
Retirement saving 0 2 1
Skills transfer 0 2 4
Other 1 0 0
5.5.3.3 Workers' expectations of the scheme
Two committee members and two shareholder workers did not have any expectations
about the scheme. It is interesting to find that those who had expectations were
interested in their future and the future of their children. Some workers expected
benefits from the farm. One committee member even indicated that the farm could
only be successful if the former farm owner left. The same committee member said
that the project was good although the business plan was weak. Those who had
expectations indicated that management was aware of their expectations. Only one did
not think that their expectations would be fulfilled. The manager felt that the
objectives for establishing the scheme had been achieved. On average respondents
were willing to remain shareholders for six years; about three did not know how long
they wanted to remain shareholders.
5.5.3.4 Role players' benefit from the scheme
One committee member was aware of benefits for him, while the rest did not. None of
the committee members knew of benefits for the shareholder workers. They were,
however, aware of benefits for the former farm owner. On the other hand, all but one
of the shareholders was aware of his benefits. One shareholder worker knew of
benefits for the former farm owner and five shareholder workers knew of benefits for
other shareholder workers.
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5.5.4 Socio-economic aspects
5.5.4.1 Changes on thefarm
It is disappointing that most of the respondents seem to believe that there had been no
changes in various aspects of the farm since the implementation of the farmworker
equity-sharing scheme (see Table 5.13). The manager indicated that there had been no
change in authoritative power and gender treatment. Some respondents felt that some
of the aspects had changed negatively. Most respondents believed that only working
conditions had changed for the better.
Table 5.12: Shareholder workers' response to changes Farm D (n=14)
Don't know Better Worse No change
Health issues 0 3 1 10
Education 0 3 1 10
Housing 1 1 0 12
Working conditions 0 10 1 3
Food security 0 4 2 8
Authoritative power 0 3 1 10
Security of employment 0 5 1 8
Trust 0 8 2 4
Skills transfer 0 4 2 8
Gender treatment 0 0 1 14
Relations 0 3 2 9
5.5.4.2 Training and skills transfer
Committee members as well as shareholder members indicated that they had not
received any training, so most of the questions were not applicable to them. However,
the manager indicated that farmworkers received formal training on financial and
managerial aspects, although he felt that the training was insufficient and that
farmworkers needed more training. According to the manager, the farm used a
consultant to do the training.
5.5.4.3 Wages and dividends
All committee members received weekly wages and yearly bonuses. Some
shareholder workers received daily wages and others weekly wages but all confirmed
that they received yearly bonuses. The farm has not yet paid dividends since the
inception of the scheme. A number of the respondents didn't know why dividends
weren't paid. Most respondents indicated that they believed dividends would be paid
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after five years. One even believed that the farm was bankrupt. The manager
remarked that the profits are used to payoff loans; then dividends would be paid.
According to the manager, farmworkers received performance bonuses but all the
interviewed respondents said that they only received yearly bonuses.
5.5.4.4 Absenteeism
The interviewed manager did not have this information available.
5.5.4.5 Gender relations
One committee member and two shareholder workers indicated that males and
females are treated differently with regard to wages for the same work. The manager
disagreed, saying that there is no difference in treatment in any way due to gender.
5.5.4.6 Education of farmworkers ' children
Most of the respondents came from settlement areas outside the farm, so their children
went to schools closer to or situated in those areas. The children of those who lived on
the farm attended schools in the settlement areas or in town. Free transport was
provided for the children attending school in town.
5.5.4.7 Housing situation on the farm
None of the interviewed shareholder workers lived on the farm and only two
committee members lived on the farm. They had houses with four or five rooms,
electricity, tap water and sanitation. They both paid for electricity and water but only
one paid for sanitation. These respondents lived with their spouse and two and three
children respectively. The houses were leased to both respondents. The manager
indicated that there were other houses situated on adjacent farms, which were not part
of this farm. These houses were leased to workers at a discounted rent. Workers have
to evacuate the houses when they no longer work for the farm. There were about 22
permanent shareholder farmworkers living on the farm out of a total of 75, and only
two permanent non-shareholder farmworkers lived on the farm. No new houses have
been built.
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5.5.4.8 Worker relations on the/arm
Three committee members felt that their direct manager was approachable; the other
one did not. However, all agreed that they received clear instructions for their work.
About 77 shareholder workers felt that their direct manager was approachable and all
but one shareholder members felt they are given clear instructions for their work.
Fifty six percent of shareholder workers and 50 percent of committee members felt
that the communication with their direct managers was good. Thirty three percent of
shareholder workers and 25 percent of committee members felt that it was
satisfactory, and one committee member and one shareholder worker felt that it was
bad or deteriorating.
5.5.4.9 Health issues on the/arm
All respondents indicated that they received health services III town. They did,
however, acknowledge that free transport was made available to take them to town for
these health services.
5.5.5 Other aspects of the farm
Specific working conditions:
Two shareholder workers commented that they did work that is detrimental to their
health and that they were not given any protective gear. The farm had restrooms in the
fields where farmworkers worked.
Comments:
Negative - Unlike the manager, who had no negative comments, all the other
respondents expressed their grievances. About 25 percent of the respondents
complained about poor communication, stating that the manager made the decisions
on his own without including them.
The most general complaint was that weekly wages fluctuated and that payment is
poor. Some respondents indicated that they had no trust in the manager (former farm
owner) and that they thought he wasn't the right person to lead the farm. According to
them, he became angry quickly and he knew nothing about finance. Some of the
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comments were rather harsh; one respondent said that the manager was still a "wit
boer" (white farmer).
Positive - Only the manager had a positive remark about the farmworker equity-
sharing scheme on the farm. He was of the opinion that government's initiative on
land reform is good, but that there is a need for post support programmes. Training
should be compulsory and the government should appoint a trainer in the first
financial year. This needs to be done before implementation.
5.6 Evaluation of Farm E
5.6.1 Descriptive summary of the farm
This farmworker equity-sharing scheme, situated in Ceres, is rather different from the
other farmworker equity schemes implemented by DLA. The scheme was partly
financed and approved by the DLA under its LRAD programme, but under certain
conditions. Farmworkers hold shares in a cold storage facility instead of the farm.
About 932 farmworkers from several estates joined to establish a cold storage facility
in 2003. This was accomplished through negotiations by the management of the
estates. The scheme is organised as a company with farmworkers holding 90 percent
of the shares and the estate's management holding 10 percent of the shares in the
facility. One manager from the facility management which is comprised of both
farmworkers and the estate's management bodies was selected to manage the day-to-
day operation of the facility. The interviewed respondent was the chairman of the
board.
5.6.2 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
There are two parties involved in this farmworker equity-sharing scheme, namely the
former farm owner (10%) and the farmworkers (90%). Farmworkers are represented
on the board of directors by four trust members. The board also includes two
management group representatives and two cooperative representatives.
5.6.2.1 Relations of power
Farmworkers have worker representatives on the farm. Only three shareholder
workers were satisfied with the representatives; the other five were not. The main
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reason for the dissatisfaction was the lack of consultation and feedback from the
representatives. Other reasons were unfulfilled promises and the fact that the
representatives did not have power but the consultant did. According to one
respondent, there was a lot of confusion amongst the leaders.
5.6.2.2 Beneficiaries' influence on decision making
Committee members and shareholder workers seemed to influence a wide range of
decisions on the farm. In Figure 5.5 it can be seen that more that 50 percent of the
committee members felt that they influence most of the decisions such as strategic
planning and financial aspects. Most shareholder workers only felt that they influence
wage issues. Committee members together with shareholder members felt that they
don't influence decisions on working conditions and employment issues. Committee
members indicated that they influence day-to-day operations on of the farm,
shareholder workers did not feel the same. The manager agreed that farmworkers
influenced all other aspects but not the day-to-day operation.
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Figure 5.6: Respondents influence on decision making on Farm E
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5.6.3 The establishment of the scheme
Some respondents named more than one person who had the idea to establish the
farmworker equity-sharing scheme. About 45 percent of the respondents believed it
was farmworkers, 35 percent believed it was the former farm owner and 30 percent
believed it was the government. Five percent said they did not know. The manager
indicated that it was management's idea. All respondents signed contracts to work on
the farm.
5.6.3.1 Motivation for the establishment of the scheme
From Table 5.14 it can be seen that the manager agreed with all the reasons listed as
motivation for the establishment of the equity-sharing scheme. He also added
transformation as a reason. Some committee members and shareholder workers felt
that some of the reasons did not serve as motivation for establishing the equity-
sharing scheme. The reason for this might be the nature of the equity-sharing scheme,
as shareholders do not have direct shares in a farm but in a facility. According to most
respondents the main motivation was to improve workers' income (55%). A hundred
percent of the shareholder members chose this as the reason behind the establishment
of the scheme.
Table 5.13: Motivation for establishment of the scheme on Farm E
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=l n=6 0=13
Reasons Yes Yes Yes
Improve productivity 1 4 7
Improve workers' income 1 3 13
Improve workers' wealth 1 5 5
ImQfove job security 1 2 7
Improve relations 1 5 4
Improve worker loyalty 1 5 8
Empower workers 1 3 10
Other 1 0 0
5.6.3.2 Role players' motivation for joining the scheme
Most shareholder workers indicated that expected increase in income was their main
motivation for joining the equity-sharing scheme. This motivation was followed by
expected security of employment. Expected increase inwealth and skills transfer were
not major motivations for most shareholder workers. Most committee members felt
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that expected increase in wealth was their motivation for joining the scheme. Unlike
shareholder workers, committee members felt that retirement saving and skills
transfer were the other main motivations. The manager wasn't motivated by
retirement saving and increase in wealth.
Table 5.14: Respondents' motivation for joining the scheme on Farm E
Manager Committee Shareholder workers
n=1 n=6 n=13
Motivation to join Yes Yes Yes
Security of employment 1 3 8
Increase in income 1 3 11
Increase in wealth 0 5 6
Retirement saving 0 4 5
Skills transfer 1 4 6
Only one shareholder worker indicated that he had participated in an equity-sharing
scheme before. Otherwise none of these respondents had any previous experience in
an equity-sharing scheme. All respondents believed that they made the right decision
in joining the equity-sharing scheme.
5.6.3.3 Workers' expectations of the scheme
All committee members and almost all shareholder workers, except two, had
expectations of the scheme. The main expectation was to provide a better future for
their children. Some indicated that they believed that the scheme would work and
continue as a profitable company. Others said that they would expand, pay dividends
in the future, and even become owners of the farm in the next five years. One
respondent indicated that they would like to have black and white skilled managers.
All the respondents who had expectations acknowledged that management was aware
of their expectations and believed that their expectations would be fulfilled. Everyone
indicated that they would like to remain shareholders for more than ten years; some
even indicated that they will be shareholders for the rest of their lives. The only
respondents who were not sure about remaining shareholders were those who did not
have expectations of the scheme.
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5.6.3.4 Role players' benefit from the scheme
Five of the six committee members knew of benefits for themselves, while only one
knew of benefits for the former farm owner. Three knew of benefits for other
shareholders workers. Nine of the 13 shareholder workers interviewed knew of
benefits for themselves, four knew of benefits for the former farm owner and 11 knew
of benefits for other shareholder workers.
5.6.4 Socio-economic aspects
5.6.4.1 Changes on the farm
The manager felt that all the aspects changed positively since the implementation of
the equity-sharing scheme. Committee members and shareholder workers did not
share his view.
Table 5.15: Committee members' response to changes on Farm E (n=6)
Better Worse No change
Health issues 3 0 3
Education 5 0 1
Housing 3 0 3
Working conditions 3 1 2
Food security 1 0 5
Authoritative power 5 0 1
Security of employment 5 1 0
Trust 6 0 0
Skills transfer 5 1 0
Gender treatment 4 1 1
Relations 6 0 0
The responses of committee members regarding changes on the farm since the
implementation of the equity-sharing scheme are illustrated in Table 5.16. Some
respondents felt that some of the changes were negative. All respondents agreed that
trust and relations have changed for the better. Most respondents indicated that
education, authoritative power, security of employment and skills transfer had also
changed for the better. Most respondents did not believe that food security has
changed at all.
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Table 5.16: Shareholder workers' response to changes on Farm E (n= 13)
Better Worse No change
Health issues 6 0 7
Education 9 0 4
Housing 8 0 5
Working conditions 9 0 4
Food security 7 0 6
Authoritative power 9 0 4
Security of employment 8 0 5
Trust 9 0 4
Skills transfer 10 0 3
Gender treatment 10 0 3
Relations 9 0 4
Shareholder workers were divided in their responses regarding changes on the farm.
The majority felt that there were changes in various aspects and that these changes
have been for the better. It can be seen from Table 5.17 that most shareholder workers
felt that skills transfer and gender relations" have greatly changed. More respondents
indicated that health issues have not changed than those who believed that it did.
5.6.4.2 Training and skills transfer
Figure 5.6 illustrates that all interviewed shareholder workers and more than 80
percent of the committee members had received training on financial and managerial
aspects. All the committee members indicated that they had received managerial
training. No committee members indicated that they had received informal training
and some shareholder workers believed that they received both informal and formal
training. Almost 40 percent of the shareholder workers did not feel that the training
had been sufficient, while 100 percent of the committee members believed that the
training was sufficient. The manager indicated that all workers on the farm had
received formal training on the financial and managerial aspects, but even he did not
think that the training was sufficient.
23 From observation, there were female tractor drivers on the farm. The manager added that they found
that female drivers were more careful and faster than male drivers.
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Figure 5.7: Farmworker shareholders' response regarding training received on
FarmE
5.6.4.3 Wages and dividends
According to the manager, workers received daily remuneration with no yearly
bonuses or performance bonuses. However, committee members and shareholder
workers indicated that they received weekly remuneration; one shareholder worker
said he received monthly remuneration. About 67 percent of committee members and
23 percent of shareholder workers indicated that they received yearly bonuses and
about four committee members and one shareholder worker indicated that they
received performance bonuses. Everyone agreed that they have received dividends
from the scheme, which were paid out in 2003. The dividends were paid out in cash to
all the shareholders.
5.6.4.4 Absenteeism
The manager indicated that no information on absenteeism was available.
5.6.4.5 Gender relations
Half of the committee members and three shareholder members indicated that there
was a difference in how male and female workers were treated. Four committee
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members and two shareholder indicated that wages for male and female workers
doing the same work differed. The manager disagreed with these statements.
5.6.4.6 Education of farmworkers ' children
All the committee members' school-aged children attended school and only three
shareholder workers did not have any children at school. Most of the children
attended school in town, while some did so on the farm or in their settlement area.
Free transport to school was provided for all children.
5.6.4.7 Housing situation on the farm
All the interviewed respondents lived on the farm. The houses ranged from two to six
rooms in size, with an average of five rooms. About 47 percent indicated that they
owned the houses, 32 percent indicated that the houses were leased to them, 16
percent said that the houses were lent to them, and five percent indicated that the
houses belonged to the farm. The houses had electricity, sanitation and tap water.
Everyone paid for electricity. All the shareholder workers and three committee
members did not pay for tap water and sanitation. There are about 80 houses on the
farm and no new houses were built since the implementation of the scheme.
Respondents lived with three children on average and most shared their houses with
their spouses. Only one shareholder worker was living with parents.
5.6.4.8 Worker relations on thefarm
Farmworkers elect their worker representatives who represent them on the farm
management board. Respondents agreed that their representatives were satisfactory in
their representation. All respondents agreed on receiving clear instructions for their
work and all agreed that their direct managers were approachable. About 77
shareholder workers and 83 percent of the committee members indicated that they
make suggestion and 50 percent shareholder workers felt that their suggestions are not
taken. However they don't all agree that they receive feedback from their suggestions.
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5.6.4.9 Health issues on the/arm
Two committee members declared that no health services were provided on the farm,
but all other respondents acknowledged that health services were provided by a
mobile clinic. The manager also indicated that there was a nearby clinic that was used.
5.6.5 Other aspects of the farm
Specific working conditions:
All respondents agreed that their direct manager was approachable and that they were
given clear instructions for their work. Fifty three percent of respondents felt that
communication with their direct managers was satisfactory and 47 percent felt that it
was good. Few respondents indicated that they do work detrimental to their health and
they all agreed that they receive protective gear from the farm.
Comments:
Negative - The few respondents who had negative comments mentioned that trustees
and other shareholders did not receive enough training.
Positive - Few respondents had both positive and negative comments. The manager
commented that ownership and better income were the positive things to come from
this endeavour. Committee members' and shareholder workers' positive comments
were that dividends had already been paid out in the first year of operation, that
trustees were positive, and that the farmworkers had a feeling of ownership.
5.7 Chapter summary
The evaluation of the farms shows that the institutional arrangements and governance
of the farm differs in terms of the involvement of the farmworkers in the management
of the scheme. While all farmworkers have representatives on the management body
or representation on the farm, their perception on their level of decision influence
differs. There are also deferent perceptions on their knowledge of the operations of
the farm and the benefits farmworkers expect from the schemes. The financial
evaluation of the farms from which financial records were available is dealt with in
Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER SIX
COMPARISON OF THE FARMS AND THEIR FINANCIAL EVALUATION
6.1 Introduction
The obj ective of this chapter is to present a comparison of all the farms evaluated. The
chapter ends with an evaluation of the financial results of two farms from which
financial statements were available with the use of the available information.
6.2 Statistical comparison of all the farms evaluated
This section investigates whether there is any relationship between the responses
received from the various respondent groups (managers, committee members and
shareholder workers) in all the farms evaluated. The responses were compared by
constructing a contingency table, which was used to establish whether there was
independence between two or more variables. The test was performed at a 95 percent
confidence level. Thus, if p~0.05 the null hypothesis is accepted and if p:S0.05 the null
hypothesis is rejected.
6.2.1 Motivation for establishing the farmworker equity-sharing schemes
In Table 6.1 it can be seen that there was no variable which could lead us to reject the
null hypothesis, except of one variable which is less than 0.05.
Table 6.1: Respondent's motivation for establishing the schemes
Variable Probability value
Improve productivity P=0.395583
Improve income P=0.424999
Improve wealth P=O.322683
Improve security of employment P=0.165546
Improve relations P=0.131661
Improve workers' loyalty P=0.404977
Improve empowerment P=O.393822
Most important motivation P=O.OOI829
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The variable with the lowest probability value was 'most important motivation'. This
means that we can reject the null hypothesis. Most respondents chose different
variables as their most important motivations for establishing farmworker equity-
sharing schemes on their farm.
Respondents joined the schemes for different reasons and all the variables have
probability values greater than 0.05.
Table 6.2: Respondent's reasons for joining the schemes
Variable Probability value
Security of employment p=0.350195
Increase in income p=0.882880
Increase in wealth p=0.200426
Retirement saving p=0.266269
Skills transfer p=0.599124
Other reasons p=0.087949
Forced to join p=0.739026
6.2.2 Changes on the farms
There are no variables from the respondent's answers about changes on the farm that
could lead rejecting the null hypothesis. Skills transfer is only near to the variable
close to the reason of rejecting the null hypothesis with the lowest probability value of
0.06. All variables had values greater than 0.05.
Table 6.3: Respondent's answers to changes on the farms
Variable Probability value
Health p=0.550627
Education p=0.552037
Housing p=0.714380
Working conditions p=0.482655
Food security 1)_=0.381181
Authoritative power p=0.706195
Employment security p=0.455955
Trust p=0.404601
Skills transfer p=0.060587
Gender treatment p=0.183392
Relations p=0.166746
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6.3 Financial evaluation of each case studies
Financial evaluation was limited to the farms that could provide financial statements.
The reasons for the unavailability of financial statements in most of the farms were
the liquidation process. One farmworker equity-sharing scheme was only months in
operation hence its financial statements could not be used.
The aim of the financial evaluation is to analyse the business' past and present
performance in the long run or in a number of years. The financial evaluation uses
ratio analysis to perform trend analysis, using information from the income statements
and balance sheet. A general overview of the industry within which the equity-sharing
scheme is operating will be given, looking at the price changes that have occurred
over time. Only two farms could provide financial statements due to reasons
mentioned above. Even these farms had different problems such as incomplete
financial statements and the unavailability of certain information because it was not
captured.
Financial analysis of the equity-sharing scheme only use the information given by the
farm, hence the analysis is limited to possible financial ratios. Farm A had been
liquidated already and its financial statements were difficult to find as the farm had to
have forensic audits done. However financial statements that could be retrieved from
the files available from DLA were not inclusive and they were to be sorted at a later
stage. This resulted to financial evaluation being difficult to conduct.
6.3.1 Financial evaluation of Farm A
Financial evaluation of Farm A consisted of liquidity ratios, profitability ratios and
solvency ratios. This farm was undergoing liquidation.
6.3.1.1 Land use
The total size of the farm included in the equity-sharing scheme is 200 hectares. The
land use on the farm comprised of 45.85 hectares of cultivated irrigated land and
154.15 hectares of veld.
There are two enterprises on the farm included in the equity-sharing scheme, fruit and
vineyard. In total about 45.85 hectares of irrigated land of the farm in the equity-
sharing scheme.
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Table 6.4: Enterprise on Farm A
Cultivar name Enterprise Irrigated
(ha)
Packhams Triumph Pears 8.09
Rosemarie Pears 4.04
Angeleno Pears 1.30
Larry Arme Pears 1.16
Songold Plums 1.35
Leatitia Plums 1.22
Braestar ARples 1.48
Fuji Apples 1.53
Golden Deliciuos Apples 2.11
Granny Smith Apples 3.15
Pink Lady Apples 6.98
Sundowner Apples 2.04
LabernetSauvignon Vineyard 7.70
Cabernet Sauvignon Vineyard 3.70
TOTAL 45.85
6.3.1.2 Financial analysis
There is a great difficulty in comparing or analysing the above ratios as there is no
trend that one can compare the present situation with the previous years.
(a) Liquidity
Liquidity ratios are calculated from the consolidated balance sheet of the period until
the 31 March 2003. Here the current-asset ratio is 2.437, this is above the
recommended ratio. The acid test ratio shows a higher number than the current-asset
ratio as it was 3.0. Intermediate ratio shows that the total current assets together with
the medium-term assets were less than total current liabilities and the medium term
liabilities. This shows that the liquidity of the farm was actually relying on short-term
assets rather than on long-term assets.
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Table 6.5: Financial ratio analysis of Farm A
Period
Ratios 2002/03
Liquidity
Current-asset ratio 2.436
Acid test ratio 3.721
Intermediate ratio 0.901
Solvency
Net capital ratio 1.000
Leverage ratio 2.280
Financial efficiency
Turnover ratio 0.778
Gross ratio 0.718
(b) Solvency
It can be deduced from the net capital ratio that the total liabilities of the farm were
more than the total assets meaning the farm was insolvent. The sale of the farm's
assets could not payoff the farms' liabilities. The leverage ratio shows how small the
difference between the total liabilities and the net worth is. The ratio is computed
from the total assets divided by the net worth or total assets divided by the total
liabilities.
(c) Financial efficiency
Due to the irregular operations of the farm because of the liquidation process, the
financial statements and the financial period was altered by the process. This made it
hard to perform a trend analysis from the statements. However the analysis shows that
the farm's turnover ratio was 0.778.
6.3.2 Farm B
Financial evaluation of Farm B consisted of liquidity ratios, profitability ratios,
solvency ratios.
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6.3.2.1 Land use
The total size of the farm included in the equity-sharing scheme is 1.235 hectares.
Cultivated irrigated land makes up 100 hectares of the farm, with 52 hectors of
cultivated dryland and 20 hectares of farm yard and waste land.
Table 6.6: Operating enterprise on the Farm B
Cultivar name Operating Irrigated Cultivar name Operating Irrigated
enterprise (ha) enterprise (ha)
Fairtime Peaches 3.18 Fantasia Nectarines 6.1
Bokkeveld Peaches 0.52 Independence Nectarines 6.87
Waveren Peaches 0.18 Flavourtop Nectarines 0.40
Hantam Peaches 0.18 Fiesta Red Nectarines 2.68
Suncrest Peaches 2.35 Donnerine Nectarines 1.25
Kakamas Peaches 2.5
Bonnigold Peaches 1.93 Packhams Pears 7.64
Triumph
Alberta Peaches 0.48 Cornice Pears 5.60
Sunsweet Peaches 0.66 Bon Crection Pears 9.83
Suncrest Peaches 0.96 Forelle Pears 10.38
Clapps Pears 1.71
Bepeco Apricots 1.07
Soldonne Apricots 1.21 Van der Merve Prunes 5.2
Ladysan Apricots 1.02
Peeka Apricots 0.21
TOTAL 45.85
There are five enterprises on the farm making up the equity-sharing scheme, namely
fruit and vineyard. Only one enterprise makes up the equity sharing-scheme on the
farm, namely pears. Bearing pears take up about 42.59 hectares of the total irrigated
land, peaches and nectarines 21.82 hectares, prunes taking up 6.2 hectares, apricots
take up 3.51 hectares. The last enterprise is tomatoes occupying about 26 hectares of
the irrigated land. These tomatoes were planted in tunnels of 9 X 30 m per tunnel. In
total there were 21 tunnels.
6.3.2.2 Financial analysis
Financial analysis of the equity-sharing scheme only use the information given by the
farm, hence the analysis is limited to possible financial ratios.
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Table 6.7: Financial ratio analysis of Farm B
Period
Ratios 2000/01 2001102 2002/03
Liquidity
Current-asset ratio 0.468 0.444 2.856
Acid test ratio 0.468 0.444 2.856
Intermediate ratio 2.092 0.954 3.489
Solvency
Net capital ratio 0.547 0.518 0.521
Leverage ratio 2.209 2.075 2.089
Financial efficiency
Expense structure 0.659 0.665 0.626
Gross ratio 2.659 1.548 1.050
(a) Liquidity
Liquidity as the measure of the degree to which short-term debt liabilities can be paid
from cash or short term assets here has improved over the 2002/03 period. Current-
asset ratios of 2.0 and higher are seen as an indication that the farm or business is in a
good state. However as Farm B had current-asset ratios below 1.5 for the 2000/01 and
2001/02 periods, this does not mean that its financial status was bad as this could only
be known if the operations of the farm are well know. Businesses with continuous
sales throughout the year can survive with ratios below 1.5. The acid test ratio
depicted the same results as those mentioned for current-asset ratio. Intermediate ratio
indicates the extent to which the farm could payoff debts over the medium term. This
ratio shows a strain that the farm experienced over the 2001/02 period as there was a
decline.
(b) Solvency
Farm B has positive solvency ratios with the net capital ratio and the leverage ratios
being positive and fairly stable over the period. Solvency ratio measure the rate at
which a business could payoff its debts, hence on Farm B the total liabilities
exceeded total assets. This is shown by the net capital ratio calculated over the period.
Ratios for the period 2000/01 was 2.2, but decreased slightly to 0.9 for the 2001102
and 2.0 for 2002/03 period.
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(c) Financial efficiency
The analysis was going to utilise the ratios mentioned on Chapter Four, Section
4.2.3.3 to evaluate the financial performance of the farms but due to the information
received from the farms this was not possible.
There was no significant change on the expense structure ratios of the farm. These
ratios show that the fixed cash expenses of the farm are less than total cash expenses.
Total expenses are greater than the gross farm income of the farm. This could mean
that the farm is in trouble as its expenses outweigh its gross farm income.
6.4 Chapter summary
Using the financial information from two farms that could provide this information,
the analysis provided the farm's liquidity, solvency and financial efficiency. Both
farms showed strains in their liquidity as Farm A was relying on short-term assets
while Farm B only showed strains during a certain period. Both farms during the
analysis were insolvent. This was to be expected of Farm A as it was facing
liquidation. Sporadic financial information availability from the two farms was a
challenge as this made it difficult to analyse their financial efficiency and to perform
trend analysis. The difficulty under which Farm B operated under could be resulting
from the marker and/or environmental challenges the farms operate under.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Introduction
The conclusions from the findings of the study are presented in this chapter. The
chapter ends with a discussion of recommendations for the implementation and
operation of farmworker equity-sharing schemes in South Africa.
7.2 Conclusions
Extensive similarities between the case studies were discovered. These similarities
included land tenure arrangements, the implementation of the scheme, beneficiaries'
understanding and participation in the scheme. The case studies did differ with regard
to housing issues and training received by workers.
7.2.1 Institutional arrangements and governance of the farm
All the farmworker equity-sharing schemes included in this study had different
structural and situational aspects. Two of the schemes had already undergone one or
two liquidation processes as previous farmworker equity-sharing schemes failed.
Farmworkers then utilised commercial loans to buy these farms, this resulting in total
farmworker ownership of the farms, Farms A and C. These farms started out with
former farm owners and their workers implementing a farmworker equity-sharing
scheme.
The first schemes failed and the farms were liquidated, whereupon farmworkers
approached the DLA and the bank to buy the farm and have total ownership of the
scheme. However, even though these two farms were run by farmworkers at the time
of the study, they were on the brink ofliquidation due to financial problems.
In the case of Farms B, D and E, the former farm owner was part of the shareholding
company of the same farm. The organisational forms of these schemes differed
depending on the type of a farmworker equity-sharing scheme existing on the farm.
At the completion of this study, Farm D was already being liquidated. However, it is
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difficult to conclude that the failure of these schemes could be a result of their
institutional arrangements.
7.2.2 Establishment of the scheme
The respondents from all the farms differed greatly in their perceptions of whose idea
it had been to implement equity-sharing schemes. It ranged from the manager to the
former farm owner to the farmworkers. There were no or few workshops on the farms
to introduce farmworker equity-sharing schemes or educate farmworkers about these
schemes. If this is the case, how could farmworkers from farms that had never before
practiced an equity-sharing scheme initiate such an idea? Although worker
representatives were involved in the initial negotiations regarding the implementation
of the schemes, there seems to be less communication to the workers about the
implementation of the schemes.
7.2.3 Beneficiaries' assessment of the scheme
There were certain similarities between the farms on what motivated them to establish
farmworker equity-sharing schemes. On Farm A the main motivation was improving
relations, on Farms B, C and E it was improving workers' income, and on Farm D it
was improving workers' wealth. Farmworkers from Farm A believed that the scheme
was meant to improve worker relations. Although there was a high failure of these
schemes on average, most respondents indicated that they would remain shareholders
for more than five years. These respondents had their own expectations of the
schemes, such as a better future for their children. From the schemes under
liquidation, respondents felt that they could make a success of another scheme, as
they believed that they had learnt from their mistakes.
7.2.4 Economic aspects
Only one scheme had paid dividends to their workers although some have been in
operation for more than eight years. Different reasons were given for this. Some
managers indicated that the dividends would be paid in a few months from the date of
the interview. Another reason was that there were no dividends expected as they were
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still paying off debts. Two schemes had started recently and one of them had already
paid dividends in the first few months in operation.
7.2.5 Training and skills transfer
Training provided for committee members and farmworker shareholders was
disappointing. On Farm D, for example, none of the interviewed respondents,
excluding the manager, had received any training whatsoever. On Farm C, on the
other hand, all the respondents had received formal training on all aspects. These
respondents also believed that the training was sufficient. Respondents on Farm E
indicated that a training programme was going to be implemented to train their
beneficiaries.
Some managers complained that government needed to play a bigger role in
farmworker equity-sharing schemes, including in training. Without formal training
beneficiaries would find it difficult to utilise and benefit from shareholding as they
don't understand the purpose and operation of it. This devalues some of the benefits
derived from such schemes, such as improved production due to enthusiastic workers.
Those that had received training on the farms indicated that they believed that skills
transfer had improved since the implementation of the schemes.
7.2.6 Changes on the farms
The study has shown that changes are taking place on the farms due to the
implementation of farmworker equity-sharing schemes. Most respondents indicated
that changes have been for the better. Respondents on Farms A and D, however, did
not experience any changes. Farm C had the highest number of shareholder workers
indicating that there were positive changes on the farm. Farm A's negative response
could be the result of the liquidation process, which negatively influenced workers'
enthusiasm. Farm C was wholly owned by farmworkers and had only recently
experienced the liquidation process.
Due to poor record keeping none of the managers could provide information on the
changes in absenteeism since the implementation of the scheme. Committee members,
on the other hand, indicated that workers were more enthusiastic than before.
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However, no additional employees have been appointed in any of the schemes since
its implementation.
7.2.7 Housing situation on the farm
Almost all the workers lived on the farms they were employed on. Interestingly, on
some of the farms - especially on Farm D, where none of the workers lived on the
farm - even the committee members did not live on the farm. Farms that had housing
arrangements for their workers provided basic necessities such as tap water, electricity
and sanitation. Most of these, excluding electricity, didn't have to be paid for. These
arrangements signify improvements in the housing situation on the farms.
7.2.8 Financial aspects
The number of schemes for which financial statements could be obtained indicates the
level at which these schemes struggle, even to the point of liquidation. One of the
farms for which financial statements could be analysed had already been liquidated. It
is difficult to make a conclusion on the state of the farms from their financial analysis
as the information provided or acquired was not inclusive of all the required
information. However the analyse show that there were periods when the financial
situation on the farm would require attention such as in Farm B. Solvency ratios
showed that the farm's total liabilities were more than its total assets. The liquidity
ratios showed an improvement over the last period as they were on the recommended
level which is higher than 2.0.
7.2.9 Other aspects of the farmworker equity-sharing schemes
In general, there are great improvements III the treatment of the
farmworkers/beneficiaries from the farms in respect to gender treatment and working
conditions on the farms.
7.3 Recommendations
The general objectives of financial participation and farmworker equity-sharing
schemes in general are for the benefit of all involved. As discussed in the literature
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review, a holistic view is necessary to improve the chances for success in farmworker
equity-sharing schemes. These schemes are not suppose to be used to mend existing
problems; a favourable environment needs to be created beforehand. It has been found
that actual skills transfer and empowerment does not take place in all of these
schemes. The shortfall is on the conditions under which the LRAD is granted. There
are no clear tabulated specifications and recommendations on the training and skills
transfer process need to be followed by farms implementing these schemes.
More emphasis also needs to be placed on the real empowerment of the farmworkers
in terms of participation in the management, of the farm apart from the general
financial benefits that could be derived from the schemes. Because of the embodied
psychological effects the exploitative control legacy imposed on the farmworkers over
generations, their empowerment could largely depend on the success of breaking their
psychological barriers. One of the challenges is to assist the beneficiaries understand
what it means to be a shareholder. Illiteracy is one of the main factors in the lack of
beneficiaries' understanding of their shareholding status. Employees require constant
reinforcement that they are co-owners of the farm/scheme. There needs to be pre-
introduction workshops or road shows intended to inform farmworkers about the
operation of such a scheme. During the implementation of the scheme, there needs to
be a fully integrated training programme for all the shareholders. This should include
managerial, financial and soft skills training.
Training could benefit the farmworkers as well as the former farm owner as this
drives everyone to work towards a shared common goal. Sharing in a common goal
would result in improved motivation, improved production output and improved
relations on the farm. Hence other measures that could be used to evaluate the success
of these schemes could include management arrangements, the rigour of the planning
process, integration of the farm into the global business environment and also if they
perceive a better future for their families.
As several factors contribute to the success of farmworker equity-sharing schemes,
some of the factors are outside the boundaries of the scheme. Therefore, to position
the government and other implementing agencies, one has to consider the strategy
used to implement these schemes. According to Havenga and Hobbs (2004)
communication is always important - the level of information, consultation,
negotiation and lobbying can have an important impact on strategy. Communication
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means more than simply communicating the goal to the workers; shareholders need to
communicate the strategy to be used to achieve the goals of the scheme. Therefore
these schemes should be designed and implemented through a committed effort to
find common ground between values of key stakeholders to align work and pay.
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APPENDIX A: Management questionnaire
Confidentiality status
I would like to assure you that the information you are about to give now would be treated with the strictest
confidentiality.
Most of the information required on this questionnaire pertains to the equity sharing scheme as such and not
necessarily to the entire business. Thank you.
PART 1: SOCIAL AND OTHER ASPECTS
1. Gender of the respondent Male L==:J Female L==:J
2. Name of the respondent .
3. Which position do you hold in the business involved in this equity sharing scheme?
I M ariagerf ess)
2 Manager and former owner
3 Other
If"Other", please specify .
4. In which year did the farm start with this equity sharing scheme?
5. Who initiated the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Former farm owner or manager(ess)
2 Farmworkers
3 Government
4 Don't know
5 Other
If"Other", please specify .
6. Was there any formal negotiation phase in the initiation of this equity sharing scheme between the former farm
owner and the farmworkers?
I Yes I No
7. Was there any representative for farmworkers in those negotiations?
I Yes I I No I I
8. Please indicate whether each of the following factors was a motivation for the establishment of this equity
sharing scheme?
Yes No
I To improve productivity
2 To improve workers' income
3 To improve workers' wealth
4 To improve job security
5 To improve relations(between management and workers)
6 To improve worker loyalty and create a more stable labour
force
7 To empower workers through skills transfer
8 Other
If"Other", please specify .
9. Which of the factors mentioned in question 8 above was the most important motivation for establishing this
equity sharing scheme? , .
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10. Please indicate whether each of the following factors motivated you to join the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
I Long-term security of employment Yes No
2 Expected increase in income
3 Expected increase in wealth
4 Retirement saving
5 Skills transfer
6 Don't know
7 You were forced by someone else to join
8 Other
If "Other", please specify .
II. Are the objectives for establishing the equity sharing scheme on this farm achieved?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question II above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
12. Which assets of the farm are included in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
1 .
2 .
13. Who initially financed these assets included in this equity sharing scheme?
Yes No Percentage contribution
I Own capital (farm owner)
2 Farmworkers' capital
3 Land grants
4 Commercial bank
5 Other financiers
14. What is the organisational form of the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Yes No
I Company
2 Trust
3 Close cooperation
4 Other
15. What is the organisational structure of the parties involved in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Percentage share Organisational form
1 Original farm owner
2 Farmworkers
3 Government representative
4 Union representative
5 Third party shareholder
6 Other
If "Other", please specify ..
(a) Are these shares tradable?
I NoI Yes
(i) If your answer is "Yes", in question 15(a) above, what is the procedure?
(ii) If your answer was "No", in question 15(a) above, are you satisfied with the situation?
I Yes I No
(iiijIf your answer is "No", in question 15(ii) above, what are you going to do about it?
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(b) Are shareholders allowed to exit the equity sharing scheme on this farm at their own convenient time?
I Yes I No
16. Please indicate which of the following criteria were used to qualify as a shareholder?
Yes No
1 Number of years working on this farm
2 Age
3 Gender
4 Education level
5 Permanency of work
6 Other
If"Other", please specify .
17. Were there any farmworkers who did not want to participate initially in the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 17 above, are there any farmworkers who changed their opinion
and want to participate at this stage?
I Yes I No
I 8. Are there any farmworker representatives in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) How did they become worker representatives?
Yes No
I Selected by management
2 Elected by workers
3 Volunteered
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(b) How many farmworker representatives are males and how many are females?
Gender Number
I Male
2 Female
19. Wh ti r b h b d f di ?at port 0 to mem ers are on t e oar 0 treetors.
Portfolio Number of members
I
2
3
4
20. How many farmworkers are shareholders in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Ilmo'll' I At present
21. How many permanent farmworkers are employed in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Year Farm workers Foreman Managers Others
I 2000101
2 2001102
3 2002/03
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22. How many casual farmworkers are employed in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Year Farm workers Foreman Managers Others
I 2000/01
2 2001102
3 2002/03
23. How many days were recorded for absenteeism?
Year Farm workers Foreman Managers Others
I 2000/01
2 2001/02
3 2002/03
24. Since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm, how many permanent farmworkers have been
employed, retrenched and or resigned?
Number employed Number retrenched Number resigned
I 2000/01
2 2001/02
3 2002/03
25. Did the farmworkers receive training on how an equity sharing scheme operate?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 25 above, what kind of training?
Yes No
I Financial aspects
2 Managerial aspects
3 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(b) Was the training offered by one of the farm managerial personnel (informal training)?
I NoI Yes
(c) Was the training offered by a private institution (formal training)?
I Yes I No
(d) If your answer was "Yes", in question 25 above, do you think the training they received was sufficient
with respect to the understanding of the operations of the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(e) If your answer was "No", in question 25 above, why?
(t) Are you aware of the existence of the Rural Foundation in Stellenbosch (now known as the Centre for
Integrated Rural Development based in Bellville)?
I Yes I I No
(g) If your answer is "Yes", in question 25(t) above, were your farmworkers involved in their programmes?
Yes No
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26. Which decisions are the farmworker shareholders capable of influencing on the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
Yes No
I Day-to-day operations of the farm
2 Wages
3 Working conditions
4 Health issues
5 Housing issues
6 Other
[f"Other", please specify .
27. Please indicate which of the following are included on the farmworkers' remuneration?
Yes No
I Wages: Day ...............................
Week ..............................
Month ...........................
2 Yearly bonus
3 Yearly fixed bonus
4 Performance bonus
5 Other
[f"Other", please specify .
28. Have the farmworkers received any dividends or other financial benefits since the implementation of the
scheme?
Yes No
I Dividends
2 Other financial benefits
(a) [fyour answer is "No", in question 28 above, why? Please specify.
(b) [fyour answer was "Yes", in question 28 above, when did this equity sharing scheme start paying?
(c) How are the dividends or other financial benefits paid out?
Yes No
1 Cash payouts
2 Down payment
3 Reinvested on the farm
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
29. Is there any difference in the treatment based on the same work due to gender?
I Yes I No
(a) Is there any wage difference due to gender based on the same work?
I Yes I No
(b) [fyour answer is "Yes", in question 29(a) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
30. Where are the permanent farmworkers staying?
(a) If they are staying on the farm, are there any contractual arrangements for
houses regarding farmworkers on the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Yes I No
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(b) If your answer is "Yes", in question 30(a) above, please specify.
(c) What is the number of the permanent farmworkers staying on the farm?
Permanent Number employed Number staying on the farm
I Shareholders
2 Non-shareholders
(d) How many permanent farmworker family households are on the farm?
Number of family households
I Shareholder farmworkers
2 Non-shareholder farmworkers
(e) How many new houses were built after the implementation of the equity sharing scheme?
(f) How many farmworker houses are on the farm?
(g) Please indicate the number of the houses that have the following:
Number Do farmworkers pay for these? Yes or
No (YIN)
I Electricity
2 Sanitation
3 Tap water
(h) Are you staying on the farm?
Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "Yes", in question 30(h) above, how is the house contracted to you?
31. Since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm, how has the following changed?
ITEM Better Worse No change
I Health issues
2 Education
3 Housing
4 Working conditions
5 Food security
6 Authoritative power (influence decisions)
7 Employment security
8 Trust
9 Skills
10 Gender (male to female workers) treatment based on the
same work
II Relationship with owner
32. What is you opinion about worker productivity since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm
Increased Decreased Don't know
(a) Please give a reason for your answer in question 32.
33. Are there any health services provided on the farm?
Yes No
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(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 33 above, how are these services provided?
34. How would you define the communication between you and the farmworkers?
I Good I Satisfactory I Deteriorating Bad
35. Are the farmworkers given clear instructions for their work?
I Yes I No
36. Are the farmworkers doing work that is detrimental to their health?
I Yes I No
37. Is there any protective gear given to workers to protect them when working with hazardous material?
I NoI Yes
38. Do the farmworkers have restroom facilities on the farm?
I Yes I No
39. Are the farmworkers allowed to affiliate to a union?
I Yes I No
40. Are there any negative or positive aspects you would like to comment on about the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 40 above, please comment.
(i) Positive comments:
(ii) Negative comments:
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PART B: FINANCIAL ASPECTS
I. What is the total size of the farm included in this equity sharing scheme?
2. What is the land use of the farm included in this equity sharing scheme?
Land use Hectares
I Cultivated irrigated land
2 Cultivated dryland
3 Farm yard and waste land
4 Veld
5 Other
.......................... ha
3. If the farm was purchased, what was the value and purchase price of the land and fixed improvements?
Value Purchase Price (R) Date of purchase
(R)
I Land
2 Fixed improvements
4. Number of enterprises
5. Main enterprise
6. Do you have livestock in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
7. Operating enterprises in the equity sharing scheme on this farm.
Irrigated/Dryl Bearing (ha) Non-bearing (ha)
and
Enterprise 1
Enterprise 2
Enterprise 3
Enterprise 4
Enterprise 5
8. Please give an indication of the cultivar composition of the various enterprises on the equity sharing scheme on
this farm.
Cultivar:
Area (ha)Enterprise
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Enterprise Qrrigated/ Dryland/) Enterprise (Irrigated! Drylandl)
Bearing Non-bearing Bearing Non-bearing
2000/01 2001/02 2003/04 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 00/01 01/02 02/03 00/01 01/02 02/03
Area
No of trees
Yield
Crop sales
- Export
- Local
- Other
Other income
Directly
allocable
variable costs
Fertiliser
Herbicides
Pesticides
Fungicides
Casual Labour
Packaging
Marketing
Total specified
variable costs
Margin above
specified
allocable
variable costs
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Livestock enternrise
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Product income:
- Gross sales of livestock products
- Insurance received
- Produce consumed
- Internal transfers
-Closing stock
-(minus) Opening stock
Trading income
- Gross sales of livestock
- Insurance received
- Other direct receipts
- Slaughtered livestock
(minus) Purchased livestock
Inventory change
- Closing value of livestock
-Internal transfers to other livestock
- (minus) Opening value
- (minus) Internal transfers from other livestock
Gross Value of Production
Directly allocable variable costs
Purchased feed and supplements
A.1.
Veterinary expenses
Casual labour
Total specified variable costs
Margin above specified allocable variable costs
INCOME STATEMENT
Gross value of production:
- Crops: Irrigated .
Dryland .
Livestock ..
Other. ..
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Costs:
- Wages: Managerial ..
Labour. .
- Depreciation ..
- Interest paid 0 .
- Other unspecified costs 0 .
Net farm income ..
- Operating profit. ..
- Non-farm income .
- Income before taxes .
- Income taxes ..
- Net income after tax ..
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BALANCE SHEET
Assets
2000/01
(R)
Current assets
- Cash & other receipts
- Stock on hand
- Animal feed on stock
- All other current assets
Total current assets
Intermediate assets
- Machinery and equipment
- Breeding livestock
- All other intermediate assets
Total intermediate assets
Fixed assets
Land
Fixed improvements
Total fixed assets
Total assets
Liabilities
Current liabilities
Outstanding cheques
Bank overdraft
All other current liabilities
Total current liabilities
Intermediate liabilities
Machinery loan
All other intermediate liabilities
Total intermediate liabilities
Long-term liabilities
Mortgage loans
All other long-term liabilities
Total long-term liabilities
Net worth
THANK YOU!
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APPENDIX B: Committee/board of trustees' questionnaire
Confidentiality status
I would like to assure you that the information you are about to give now would be treated with the strictest
confidentiality. Thank you.
1. Gender of the respondent
2. Name of the respondent
3. How long have you been working on this farm?
4. Which position do you hold on this farm?
5. How long have you been in this position?
6. Do you have a contractual work arrangement with the farm?
Male c==J Female
........................... year(s)
........................... year(s)
I Yes
7. Who initiated the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
1 Former farm owner or manager(ess)
2 Farmworkers
3 Government
4 Don't know
5 Other
If"Other", please specify .
8. Please indicate whether each of the following factors was a motivation for the establishment of this equity
sharing scheme?
Yes No
1 To improve productivity
2 To improve workers' income
3 To improve workers' wealth
4 To improve job security
5 To improve relations (between management and workers)
6 To improve worker loyalty and create a more stable labour
force
7 To empower workers through skills transfer
8 Other
If"Other", please specify .
9. Which of the factors mentioned in question 8 above was the most important motivation for establishing this
equity sharing scheme?
10. How did you hear about the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
1 Communicated to you by management
2 From worker representatives
3 From other farmworkers
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
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II. Please indicate whether each of the following factors motivated you to join the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
Yes No
I Long-term security of employment
2 Expected increase in income
3 Expected increase in wealth
4 Retirement saving
5 Skills transfer
6 Don't know
7 You were forced by someone else to join
8 Other
If "Other", please specify .
12. Have you ever participated in an equity sharing scheme before?
I Yes I No
13. Do you feel that it was the right decision to join the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 13 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 13 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
14. Do you know of any benefits from the equity sharing scheme on this farm to the following:
Yes No
I Yourself
2 Former farm owner
3 Shareholder farmworkers
4 Other
lf vOther", please specify .
15. Do you have expectations from the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 15 above, what are your expectations?
(b) Is the management aware of these expectations?
I Yes I No
(c) Do you think you will be able to achieve these expectations by having joined the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "No", in question 15(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(ii) If your answer was "Yes", in question 15(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
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16. Ho did b k . ?W I you ecome a wor er representative.
Yes No
I Selected by management
2 Elected by workers
3 Volunteered
4 Other
If "Other", please specify ..
(a) How many representatives are rna es an
Gender Number
I Male
2 Female
d how many are females?
(b) Which decisions are you involved in, in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Yes No
I Financial aspects
2 Strategic planning
3 Day-to-day operations
4 Technical aspects (purchasing and marketing)
5 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(c) Have you ever made any suggestions to the management?
I Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16(c) above, have your suggestions been taken?
I NoI Yes
(ii) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16(c)(i) above, did the management respond to your suggestions?
I Yes I No
(d) How many times do you meet as worker representatives?
......................... times a .
(e) What are the meetings mostly about?
(t) In your own opinion do you think that labour productivity has increased since the inception of the equity
sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(i) Please give a reason for your answer in question 16(t) above.
(g) In your own opinion do you think farmworkers in the equity sharing scheme on this farm work harder than
before the implementation of the scheme?
I Yes I No
(i) Please give a reason for your answer in question 16(g) above.
17. For how long do you want to remain a shareholder in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
...................... year(s)
18. Are you allowed to exit the equity sharing scheme on this farm at your own convenient time?
Yes No
141
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19. Since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm, how has the following changed?
ITEM Better Worse No change
I Health issues
2 Education
3 Housing
4 Working conditions
5 Food security
6 Authoritative power (influence decisions)
7 Employment security
8 Trust
9 Skills
lO Gender (male to female workers) treatment based on the
same work
Il Relationshill_ with owner
20. Which decisions do you feel like you are capable of influencing on the equity sharing scheme on this farm as a
worker shareholder?
Yes No
I Day-to-day operations of the farm
2 Wages
3 Working conditions
4 Employment issues
5 Health issues
6 Other
If"Other", please specify .
21. Did you receive training on how an equity sharing scheme operates?
Yes No
a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 21 above, what
Yes No
1 Financial aspects
2 Managerial aspects
3 Other
kind of training?
If"Other", please specify .
(b) Was this training offered by one of the farm managerial personnel (informal training)?
I Yes I No
(c) Or was the training offered by a private institution (formal training)?
I Yes I No
(d) If your answer was "Yes", in question 2 I above, do you think that the training you received was
sufficient with respect to the understanding of the operations of the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
Yes I No
22. Please indicate which of the following are included on your remuneration?
2 Yearly bonus
Yes No
Wages: Daily .
Weekly .
Monthly .
3 Performance bonus
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
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23. Have you received any dividends or other financial benefits since the implementation of the scheme?
Yes No
1 Dividends
2 Other financial benefits
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 23 above, why? Please explain.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 23 above, when did this equity sharing scheme start paying?
(c) How are your dividends or other financial benefits paid out?
Yes No
I Cash payouts
2 Down payment
3 Reinvested on the farm
4 Other
If "Other", please specify .
24. Is there any difference in treatment based on the same work due to gender?
I Yes I No
(a) Is there any wage difference due to gender based on the same work?
I Yes I No
(b) If your answer is "Yes", in question 24(a) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
25. Do you stay on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 25 above, how big is your house that you stay in?
............... Rooms
(b) How is the house contracted to you?
Yes No
I Leased
2 Borrowed
3 Owned
4 Other
If "Other", please specify .
(c) Does the house have the following:
Yes No Do you pay for these? Yes or
No (YIN)
I Electricity
2 Sanitation
3 Tap water
(d) Is there anybody staying with you in the house?
Yes No
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(e) If your answer is Yes in question 25(d) above, how is this person/these people related to you?
Number
1 Spouse
2 Children
3 Parents
4 Other
26. Are your school aged children going to school?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 26 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 26 above, where is the school situated?
Yes No
I On the farm
2 Settlement area
3 In town
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(c) If the school is not on the farm, is the transport provided for them?
I Yes I No
(d) If your answer is "Yes", in question 26(c) above, are you paying for the transport?
I Yes I No
27. Are there any health services provided on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 27 above, how are these services provided?
28. Do you feel like your direct manager(ess) is approachable?
I Yes I No
29. Are you given clear instructions for your work?
I Yes I No
30. Are you doing work that is detrimental to your health?
I Yes I No
31. Is there any protective gear given to workers to protect them when working with hazardous material?
I Yes I No
32. How would you define communication with your direct manager(ess)?
I Good I Satisfactory Deteriorating I Bad
33. Do you have restroom facilities on the farm?
I Yes I No
34. Are you affiliates to a union?
I Yes I No
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35. Are there any negative or positive aspects you would like to comment on about the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) [fyour answer is "Yes", in question 35 above, please comment.
(i) Positive comments:
(ii) Negative comments:
THANK YOU!!!
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APPENDIX C: Shareholder questionnaire
Confidentiality status
I would like to assure you that the information you are about to give now would be treated with the strictest
confidentiality. Thank you.
I. Gender of the respondent
2. Name of the respondent
3. How long have you been working on this farm?
4. Which position do you hold on this farm?
5. How long have you been in this position?
6. Do you have a contractual work arrangement with the farm?
Male c=J Female c=J
........................... year(s)
........................... year(s)
I Yes I No
7. Who initiated the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Former farm owner or manager(ess)
2 Farmworkers
3 Government
4 Don't know
5 Other
If"Other", please specify ..
8. Please indicate whether each of the following factors was a motivation for the establishment ofthis equity
sharing scheme.
Yes No
I To improve productivity
2 To improve workers' income
3 To improve workers' wealth
4 To improve job security
5 To improve relations (between management and workers)
6 To improve worker loyalty and create a more stable labour force
7 To empower workers through skills transfer
8 Other
If "Other", please specify .
9. Which of the factors mentioned in question 8 above was the most important motivation for establishing this
equity sharing scheme?
10. How did you hear about the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Communicated to you by management
2 From worker representatives
3 From other farmworkers
4 Other
If "Other", please specify .
I I. Please indicate whether each of the following factors motivated you to join the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
Yes No
I Long-term security of employment
2 Expected increase in income
3 Expected increase in wealth
4 Retirement saving
5 Skills transfer
6 Don't know
7 You were forced by someone else to join
8 Other
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If"Other", please specify .
12. Have you ever participated in an equity sharing scheme before?
I Yes I No
13. Do you feel that it was the right decision to join the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 13 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 13 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
14. Do you know of any benefits from the equity sharing scheme on this farm to the following:
Yes No
Yourself
Former farm owner
Shareholder farmworkers
Other
If"Other", please specify .
15. Do you have expectations from the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question IS above, what are your expectations?
(b) Is the management aware of these expectations?
I Yes I No
(c) Do you think you will be able to achieve these expectations by having joined the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "No", in question IS(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(ii) If your answer was "Yes", in question IS(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
16. Do you have worker representatives on the farm representative body representing your interests on the equity
sharing scheme on this farm?
I NoI Yes
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16 above, are your representatives representing you in a
satisfactory way?
Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "No", in question 16(a) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) Have you ever made any suggestions to the management through your worker representatives?
Yes No
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(i) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16(b) above, have your suggestions been accepted by the
representati ves?
I Yes I No
(ii) Do you receive report back from your worker representatives on the response of the management for
the suggestions you make?
I Yes I No
(iii) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16(b)(ii) above, did the management respond to your suggestions?
I Yes I No
17. For how long do you want to remain a shareholder in the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
...................... year(s)
18. Are you allowed to exit the equity sharing scheme on this farm at your own convenient time?
I Yes I No
19. Since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm, how has the following changed?
ITEM Better Worse No change
I Health issues
2 Education
3 Housing
4 Working conditions
5 Food security
6 Authoritative power (influence decisions)
7 Employment security
8 Trust
9 Skills
10 Gender (male to female workers) treatment based on the
same work
II Relationship with owner
20. Which decisions do you feel like you are capable of influencing on the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
Yes No
I Day-to-day operations of the farm
2 Wages
3 Working_ conditions
4 Employment issues
5 Health issues
6 Other
If"Other", please specify ..
21. Did you receive training on how an equity sharing scheme operates?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 21 above, what kind of training?
Yes No
I Financial aspects
2 Managerial a~_ects
3 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(b) Was this training offered by one of the farm managerial personnel (informal training)?
I Yes I No
(c) Or was the training offered by a private institution (formal training)?
Yes No
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(d) If your answer was "Yes", in question 2 I above, do you think that the training you received was
sufficient with respect to the understanding of the operations of the equity sharing scheme on this
farm?
Yes I No
22. Please indicate which of the following are included on your remuneration?
2 Yearly bonus
Yes No
Wages: Daily .
Weekly .
Monthly .
3 Performance bonus
4 Other
If "Other", please specify .
23. Have you received any dividends or other financial benefits since the implementation of the scheme?
Yes No
1 Dividends
2 Other financial benefits
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 23 above, why? Please explain.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 23 above, when did this equity sharing scheme start paying?
(c) How are your dividends or other financial benefits paid out?
Yes No
I Cash payouts
2 Down payment
3 Reinvested on the farm
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
24. Is there any difference in treatment based on the same work due to gender?
I Yes I No
(a) Is there any wage difference due to gender based on the same work?
I Yes I No
(b) If your answer is "Yes", in question 24(a) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
25. Do you stay on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 25 above, how big is your house that you stay in?
............... Rooms
(b) How is the house contracted to you?
Yes No
1 Leased
2 Borrowed
3 Owned
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
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(c) Does the house have the following:
Yes No Do you pay for these? Yes or
No (YIN)
I Electricity
2 Sanitation
3 Tap water
(d) Is there anybody staying with you in the house?
I NoI Yes
(e) If your answer is "Yes", in question 25(d) above, how is this person/these people related to you?
Number
I Spouse
2 Children
3 Parents
4 Other
26. Are your school aged children going to school?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 26 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 26 above, where is the school situated?
Yes No
I On the farm
2 Settlement area
3 In town
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(c) If the school is not on the farm, is the transport provided for them?
I Yes I No
(d) If your answer is "Yes", in question 26(c) above, are you paying for the transport?
I NoI Yes
27. Are there any health services provided on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 27 above, how are these services provided?
28. Do you feel like your direct manager(ess) is approachable?
I Yes I No
29. Are you given clear instructions for your work?
I Yes I No
30. Are you doing work that is detrimental to your health?
I Yes I No
31. Is there any protective gear given to workers to protect them when working with hazardous material?
Yes No
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32. How would you define communication with your direct manager(ess)?
I Good I Satisfactory I Deteriorating Bad
33. Do you have restroom facilities on the farm?
I Yes I No
34. Are you affiliates to a union?
I Yes I No
35. Are there any negative or positive aspects you would like to comment on about the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 35 above, please comment.
(i) Positive comments:
(ii) Negative comments:
THANK YOU!!!
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APPENDIX C: Non-shareholder questionnaire
Confidentiality status
I would like to assure you that the information you are about to give now would be treated with the strictest
confidentiality. Thank you.
1. Gender of the respondent
2. Name of the respondent
3. How long have you been working on this farm?
4. Which position do you hold on this farm?
5. How long have you been in this position?
6. Do you have a contractual work arrangement with the farm?
Male [==:J Female [==:J
........................ year(s)
........................ year(s)
I Yes I No
7. Do you know anything about the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
Ifyour answer is "No ". in question 7 above, please go to question 18.
Ifyour answer was "Yes ", in question 7 above, please continue with question 8 below.
8. How did you hear about the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Communicated to you bymanagement
2 From worker representatives
3 From other farmworkers
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
9. Who initiated the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
1 Former farm owner or manager(ess)
2 Farmworkers
3 Government
4 Don't know
5 Other
If"Other", please specify .
10. Please indicate whether each of the following factors was a motivation for the establishment of this equity
sharing scheme?
Yes No
I To improve productivity
2 To improve workers' income
3 To improve workers' wealth
4 To improve job security
5 To improve relations (between management and workers)
6 To improve worker loyalty and create a more stable labour
force
7 To empower workers through skills transfer
8 Other
If"Other", please specify .
II. Which of the factors mentioned in question 10 above was the most important motivation for establishing this
equity sharing scheme?
12. Have you ever participated in an equity sharing scheme before?
Yes No
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13. Why didn't you join the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
14. Do you know of any benefits to you from the equity sharing scheme on this farm tot the following:
Yes No
Yourself
Former farm owner
Shareholder farmworkers
Other
If"Other", please specify .
15. Given the experience with this equity sharing scheme would you like to join this scheme now?
I NoI Yes
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 15 above, why would you like to join the equity sharing scheme on
this farm now?
(b) If your answer was "No", in question 15 above, please give a reason(s) for you answer.
16. Do you have expectations from the equity sharing scheme on this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 16 above, what are your expectations?
(b) Is the management aware of your expectations?
I Yes I No
(c) Do you think you will be able to achieve these expectations by joining the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(i) If your answer is "No", in question 16(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(ii) If your answer was "Yes", in question 16(c) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
17. Since the inception of the equity sharing scheme on this farm, how has the following changed?
ITEM Better Worse No change
1 Health issues
2 Education
3 Housing
4 Working conditions
5 Food security
6 Authoritative power (influence decisions)
7 Employment security
8 Trust
9 Skills
10 Gender (male to female workers) treatment based on the
same work
II Relationship with owner
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18. Which decisions do you feel like you are capable of influencing on this farm?
Yes No
I Day-ta-day operations of the farm
2 Wages
3 Working conditions
4 Health issues
5 Housing issues
6 Other
If "Other", please specify .
19. Please indicate which of the following are included on your remuneration?
2 Yearly bonus
Yes No
Wages: Daily ..
Weekly ..
Monthly .
3 Performance bonus
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
20. Is there any difference in treatment based on the same work due to gender?
I NoI Yes
(a) Is there any wage difference due to gender based on the same work?
I Yes I No
(b) If your answer is "Yes", in question 22(a) above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
21. Do you stay on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 23 above, how big is your house that you stay in?
............... Rooms
(b) How is the house contracted to you?
Yes No
I Leased
2 Borrowed
3 Other
If"Other", please specify ..
(c) Does the house have the following?
Yes No Do you pay for these? Yes or
No (YIN)
I Electricity
2 Sanitation
3 Tap water
(d) Is there anybody staying with you in the house?
Yes No
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(e) If your answer is "Yes", in question 23(d) above, how is this person/these people related to you?
Number
I Spouse
2 Children
3 Parents
4 Other
22. Are your school aged children going to school?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "No", in question 24 above, please give a reason(s) for your answer.
(b) If your answer was "Yes", in question 24 above, where is the school situated?
Yes No
I On the farm
2 Dwelling area
3 In town
4 Other
If"Other", please specify .
(c) If the school is not on the farm, is the transport provided for them?
I Yes I No
(d) If your answer is "Yes", in question 24(c) above, are you paying for the transport?
I Yes I No
23. Are there any health services provided on the farm?
I Yes I No
(a) [fyour answer is "Yes", in question 25 above, how are these services provided?
24. Do you feel like your direct manager(ess) is approachable?
I Yes I No
25. Are you given clear instructions for your work?
I Yes I No
26. Are you doing work that is detrimental to your health?
I Yes I No
27. Is there any protective gear given to workers to protect them when working with hazardous material?
I Yes I No
28. How would you define communication with you and your direct manager(ess)?
I Good I Satisfactory Deteriorating I Bad
29. Do you have restroom facilities on the farm?
I Yes I No
30. Are you affiliates to a union?
Yes I No
155
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31. Are there any negative or positive aspects you would like to comment on about the equity sharing scheme on
this farm?
I Yes I No
(a) If your answer is "Yes", in question 33 above, please comment.
(i) Positive comments:
(ii) Negative comments:
THANK YOU!!!
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